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Corporate Hostility to Arbitration
Richard Frankel
In the last thirty years, corporations have aggressively and
successfully pushed the Supreme Court to invalidate virtually all state
regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses on the ground that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts any state law that expresses “hostility” to
arbitration. Under current doctrine, the FAA preempts any state law that
treats arbitration clauses less favorably than other contracts, or that is
premised on the idea that arbitration is inferior to litigation for resolving
disputes.
Yet, at the same time corporations decry state-law hostility to
arbitration, they frequently express their own hostility to arbitration in the
way they draft their arbitration provisions. By carving out specific claims
from arbitration, adopting procedural rules that approximate litigation, or
imposing restraints that make it difficult for their consumers and employees
to bring disputes in arbitration, corporations have shown that they believe
arbitration to be inferior to litigation in multiple ways.
Although scholars have widely debated the Supreme Court’s
arbitration jurisprudence, “corporate hostility” to arbitration has gone
largely unnoticed. This article examines the various methods by which
corporations express hostility to arbitration and argues that this hostility
carries significant implications for FAA preemption doctrine. Currently,
contract drafters can exempt claims from arbitration because they believe
that arbitration is inferior to litigation. But when states seek to regulate
arbitration for those same reasons, they are barred from doing so by the
FAA. Thus, corporations can exempt claims from arbitration to maximize
their self-interest, but states cannot exempt claims from arbitration to
protect the public interest.
This dichotomy is anti-democratic and results in bad policy. This
article proposes that corporate hostility to arbitration demonstrates that
not all hostility to arbitration is improper and that states should have
greater freedom to regulate arbitration clauses without violating the FAA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the debate surrounding the fairness of mandatory arbitration
clauses centers around the question of how widely the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) preempts state law. That is because many efforts to regulate the
arbitration process, or to police the perceived abuses of arbitration, come
from state legislatures or from judges who strike down arbitration clauses
when they violate state law or public policy. 1
Yet, most attempts by states to protect their citizens from being forced
to submit all disputes with employers or businesses to binding arbitration
run headlong into the FAA. According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Congress enacted the FAA in order “to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements” that existed in English common law and
to place arbitration clauses on “the same footing” as other contracts.2 As a
result, the Act preempts any state law principle, “whether of legislative or

1
See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of State Public-Policy
Based Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and an Argument for Federal Agency
Oversight, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (stating that since the mid-1980s, “state
legislatures and courts have forcefully sought in a vast array of contexts to regulate and,
indeed, to invalidate arbitration agreements that the legislatures or the courts have perceived
as threatening the interests of the state, its businesses, its consumers, or its workers”).
2
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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judicial origin”—that directly regulates arbitration clauses, that declares a
particular type of dispute non-arbitrable, or that makes arbitration clauses
enforceable only if they meet certain minimum fairness standards—on the
ground that it singles out arbitration clauses for differential treatment and
thus is hostile to arbitration. 3
Wielding this doctrine, corporations and other proponents of
mandatory arbitration have aggressively pushed the courts, and the U.S.
Supreme Court in particular, to strike down as preempted any state law that
regulates arbitration or that seeks to police the most abusive uses of
mandatory arbitration. 4 In recent years, arbitration proponents and
corporate entities have convinced the Court to expand the reach of FAA
preemption, asserting a Lochnerian5 view that the FAA entrenches a rigid
principle of freedom of contract and that it immunizes arbitration clauses
from virtually any effort to make arbitration fairer, or to invalidate
arbitration when it becomes unfair.6 Corporate organizations including the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce have taken the position that arbitration clauses
3
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). This view that the FAA was
intended have such a profound effect has been widely criticized. See infra notes 20–22 and
accompanying text.
4
For example, some state legislatures have outlawed mandatory arbitration of
personal injury claims, employment-related claims, or insurance claims. Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 759, 785–87 (2001). Similarly, some state courts have adopted rules prohibiting
mandatory arbitration of certain claims. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown,
565 U.S. 530 (2012) (discussing and striking-down ruling of the West Virginia Supreme
Court establishing that wrongful death and personal injury claims against nursing homes
could not be subject to mandatory arbitration); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988
P.2d 67 (1999) (holding that claims for injunctive relief could not be subject to mandatory
arbitration).
5
The high point in the Supreme Court’s elevation of contractual freedom to override
laws that promote the health and welfare of citizens is exemplified the famous case of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905), in which the Court struck down a state
regulation limiting the working hours of bakers as violating Due Process protections for
freedom of contract. See Matthew J. Kolodoski & Candace M. Groth, The Future of
Collective Employment Arbitration Part II: Apocalyptic Warnings, Lochnerizing, and the
Right to Contract., 24 TEX. J. ON CL & CR. 1, 3 (2018) (speculating about whether the
Supreme Court has essentially imposed a Lochnerian freedom of contract regime in its
arbitration jurisprudence).
6
See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, RentA-Center, Concepcion, and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
323, 325–26 (2011) (stating that repeated Supreme Court decisions from the last two
decades has “vastly expand[ed] the power of companies to impose and control arbitration
procedures while tying the hands of state legislatures and courts”). Corporate organizations
and organizations that litigate on behalf of corporate interests have advanced this position to
the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief for Pac. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 11, Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 573 U.S. 904 (2014) (No.
13-856) (arguing the FAA enshrines a policy “in favor of contractual freedom” and
asserting that “[t]he freedom to make and enforce contracts reflects a fundamental element
of free choice that must be protected” by the FAA).
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must be enforced according to their terms. In their view, this means that
any state principle that would place limits on how a corporation (or any
party) can draft its arbitration clause reflects the same “judicial hostility” to
arbitration that the FAA was designed to abolish. 7
Companies have good reason to aggressively expand FAA
preemption. Arbitration clauses are largely drafted by corporations.
Mandatory arbitration provisions are often included in non-negotiable,
take-it-or-leave it adhesion contracts in a variety of settings, including
employment agreements, consumer contracts, lending and financial
services, and car purchases.8 Consumers and employees have little choice
but to accept these terms and often sign agreements without even being
aware that they include mandatory arbitration provisions. This allows
corporations to stack the arbitration clause in their favor by imposing terms
that make it difficult for individuals to vindicate their rights in arbitration,
such as bans on aggregate litigation or class actions, secrecy provisions, or
shortened statutes of limitations—provisions that both scholars and
arbitration opponents claim unfairly advantage corporate parties and harm
consumers and employees. 9 The only potential backstop is state legislation
7
The Litigation Center of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been involved with or
has filed an amicus curiae brief supporting a broad reading of the FAA in virtually every
arbitration case (and particularly in cases involving FAA preemption) to come before the
U.S. Supreme Court in the last ten years, in addition to filing amicus briefs urging the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse state court and lower court decisions refusing
to enforce arbitration clauses, and filing amicus briefs in state supreme courts and
intermediate appellate courts. It advertises that “The Litigation Center fights for business at
every level of the U.S. judicial system, on virtually every issue affecting business, including
class actions and arbitration . . . .” U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, U.S. CHAMBER COM.,
https://www.uschamber.com/us-chamber-litigation-center (last visited July 17, 2019). A
search for “arbitration” on the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center’s webpage reveals the wide
range of business organizations seeking to expand the scope of the FAA and of FAA
preemption. See id. (placing “arbitration” in the search function).
8
See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “ConsumerFriendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 825, 851–53 n.103 (2012) (listing more than 35 major companies that include
mandatory arbitration provisions in their standard-form contracts); Imre Stephen Szalai, The
Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 236 (2019) (finding that 81 of the top Fortune 100 companies
use arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts); Jeff Sovern, “Whimsy Little Contracts”
with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Study of Consumer Understanding of
Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2015) (documenting the increasing use of
mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer and employment contracts and noting that
companies like PayPal and Verizon require their customers to submit disputes to mandatory
binding arbitration). A study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) found
that arbitration clauses are nearly universal in consumer financial services contracts.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION
1028(A) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE 54 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cf
pb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
9
See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87
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and public policy doctrine that tries to make arbitration fairer, as the federal
government has shown little appetite, outside of a few narrow areas, to
address mandatory arbitration.10 If that backstop is preempted by the FAA,
then companies can write their arbitration clauses however they wish, with
virtually no oversight whatsoever.
Yet, at the same time that corporations are aggressively challenging
efforts to protect consumers and employees as embodying “judicial
hostility” to arbitration, they are simultaneously displaying what this article
refers to as “corporate hostility” to arbitration. By corporate hostility, I
refer to situations where corporations carve-out certain claims, procedures
or remedies from their arbitration clauses because they believe that those
types of claims are better handled through the courts than through private
dispute resolution. 11 When corporations use carve-outs, they signal that
litigation is superior to arbitration for certain claims—at the same that they
argue in court that state legislatures and judges cannot decide that litigation
is superior to arbitration for those same claims.
For example, many parties draft arbitration clauses to exclude claims
for injunctive relief because those parties believe that arbitrators are
inferior to courts when it comes to enforcing and monitoring an
injunction.12 But when courts have held that injunctive claims cannot be
arbitrated because of an arbitrator’s inferior ability to design and manage
injunctions, corporations and other pro-arbitration groups have asserted—
IND. L.J. 239 (2012) (arguing that companies use arbitration clauses to prevent consumers
and employees from bringing claims against them); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming
Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive
Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2015). Recent statistics in the
employment arena indicate that companies fare better in arbitration than in court. See
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014) (finding employees fare worse in arbitration than in
litigation); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 68 (2015) (analyzing consumer
arbitrations from the American Arbitration Association from 2009–2013 and concluding
that corporate repeat players win at higher rates in arbitration than others and that consumers
prevail less often than shown in previous studies).
10
Indeed, if anything, Congress seems more interested in expanding mandatory
arbitration than in regulating it. In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a
final rule prohibiting the use of class action bans in arbitration clauses used by financial
services companies and other entities covered by the CFPB. Arbitration Agreements, 82
Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1040). Congress responded
by repealing the rule pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, thus permitting financial
services companies to continue inserting class action bans into their arbitration clauses. See
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class Action Suits,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-votewall-street-regulation.html.
11
See infra Part III (describing different types of carve-outs used in arbitration
clauses).
12
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
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often successfully—that such a rule is preempted. 13 In short, corporations
are doing the very same things by contract that they are saying state
lawmakers and judges are forbidden to do through the democratic process.
While there has been much scholarly consideration of judicial
hostility to arbitration,14 there has been little study of corporate hostility to
arbitration.15 This article seeks to identify and draw out the dissonance
between the two and to consider how it should affect the scope of FAA
preemption. It argues that corporate behavior in utilizing carve-outs shows
that some hostility to arbitration is normal and expected.
It is
understandable for a contracting party to choose not to require arbitration
of claims that it thinks arbitration is ill-suited to resolve. Every decision a
company makes about what claims to submit to arbitration, or about the
rules of arbitration, reflects a value judgment about the benefit of
arbitration versus litigation or the benefit of one kind of arbitration versus
another.
If corporations can express hostility to arbitration to further their
private interest, state governments should be able to express hostility to
arbitration to protect the public interest. This article proposes that the fact
that a state regulation may indicate some hostility to arbitration should not
automatically trigger preemption. Rather, just as the FAA permits
corporate hostility to arbitration, it should permit state hostility to
arbitration, unless the state law lacks any rational basis or is motivated by
improper purposes.
To be sure, one might argue that there is a fundamental difference
between parties contractually agreeing to restrict arbitration and the state
imposing limits on arbitration. The FAA reflects a view that arbitration “is
a creature of contract” and allows contracting parties, through the process
of arm’s-length bargaining and negotiation, to decide which claims to
arbitrate and which to litigate, and to tailor the arbitration process to their
own needs.16 But this reasoning has little resonance in the current world of
non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-it agreements. Instead, it merely allows a
self-interested party to set the terms of arbitration to favor its own interests,
while preventing democratically-elected and democratically-accountable
lawmakers and judges from acting in the interest of their citizens who may
13

See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
See id.
15
There has been some study of corporate use of arbitration carve-outs, most notably
by Chris Drahozal, Steven Ware, and Erin O’Connor. See infra Part III.A. But there has
been no analysis of how corporate practice with respect to carve-outs should be applied to
FAA preemption doctrine.
16
See AT&T, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (stating that the FAA
protects the contracting parties’ discretion to adopt “efficient, streamlined procedures
tailored to the type of dispute”).
14
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become the victims of unfair and one-sided arbitration provisions.
This article offers a framework for adjusting FAA preemption
doctrine to resolve this dichotomy. Many state efforts to regulate or limit
arbitration do not reflect a hostility to arbitration in its entirety, but simply
to certain aspects of arbitration—such as those that unduly restrict parties’
rights or unfairly favor one side over the other. Just as corporate contract
drafters understand that not all arbitration looks the same and that
arbitration may be better suited for some claims than others, preemption
doctrine should similarly reflect that not all hostility to arbitration is
unwarranted and in fact reflects sound policy judgment. Thus, when states
pass legislation affecting arbitration, or when state courts adopt commonlaw rules affecting arbitration, reviewing courts should presume that the
legislature or the court has sound reasons for being hostile to arbitration in
those circumstances, rather than presuming that the laws are invalid. This
approach is both faithful to the FAA and promotes democratic
accountability by allowing legislatures to carve-out exceptions to
arbitration to protect their citizens just as corporations carve out exceptions
to protect their own private interests.
Part II of this article describes the current state of FAA preemption
doctrine and how corporate organizations have fought to expand the FAA’s
preemptive scope. Part III addresses corporate hostility to arbitration and
identifies the ways that parties drafting arbitration clauses carve-out certain
claims or remedies from their clauses either because they believe the claims
are better suited for litigation or because they want to prevent plaintiffs
from bringing claims in arbitration. Part IV examines how the current
doctrine of allowing corporate hostility but disallowing legislative hostility
undermines democratic accountability and is unwarranted. Part V
addresses how corporate hostility to arbitration should affect FAA
preemption and offers two proposals for how it could justify narrowing the
FAA’s preemptive scope.
II. THE SCOPE OF FAA PREEMPTION
Driving the doctrine of FAA preemption is the notion that the FAA
was enacted to overcome perceived “judicial hostility” to arbitration. 17 The
FAA was drafted in the early twentieth century by an American Bar
Association Committee and was ultimately enacted by Congress in 1925. 18
According to the Act’s drafters, federal judges at that time were hostile to
the idea that arbitration was an adequate substitute for courts and were

17

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Bruce, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73 (1995).
See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE 15–95 (2013) (detailing the
history of the FAA’s drafting and enactment).
18
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routinely refusing to enforce arbitration clauses. 19 Their refusal derived
from two doctrines that the drafters concluded reflected a hostility toward
arbitration vis-à-vis courts. The first was the “ouster” doctrine, under
which federal courts refused to enforce any provision that would “oust”
them of jurisdiction and transfer it to private arbitrators.20 The second was
the “dual agency doctrine,” which “maintained that an arbitrator was
merely a dual agent of the parties and, as such, either party could revoke
his authority at any time.”21 As a result, arbitration clauses were essentially
“revocable at will” by either party to the agreement.22 According to the
Act’s drafters, judges were refusing to grant specific performance when a
party breached an arbitration agreement, simply because the breach
involved arbitration.23 In doing so, they were treating arbitration clauses
less favorably than other contracts on the ground that arbitration could not
be a substitute for the court’s jurisdiction: hence, “judicial hostility” to
arbitration.
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this history to mean that the
FAA was enacted to overcome “longstanding judicial hostility” to
arbitration agreements that existed dating back to English common law,
and to place arbitration agreements on “the same footing” with other

19

See Cole, supra note 3, at 762–63 (describing how, prior to the FAA’s enactment,
many American courts refused to enforce arbitration clauses).
20
See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 74
(1997); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R.
646 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.
13–15 (1924) (discussing the need for an arbitration statute in order to overcome problems
created by the ouster doctrine). The ouster doctrine was criticized for being overly
formalistic, reflecting an irrational judicial hostility to arbitration, and unduly interfering
with the freedom of contract. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A, v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–84 (2d Cir. 1942); Ezell v. Rocky Mtn. Bean & Elevator Co., 232
P. 680 (Colo. 1925); Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, Carver Cty., 296 N.W.
475, 477 (Minn. 1941) (“Arbitration simply removes a controversy from the arena of
litigation. It is no more an ouster of judicial jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement
or that peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity known as the covenant not to sue. Each
disposes of issues without litigation. One no more than the other ousts the courts of
jurisdiction.”). See also Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse:
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 61–63 (1997) (describing some
criticisms of the ouster doctrine).
21
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 74. See also Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 645 (1996).
22
See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99,
101 (2006); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 74.
23
Moses, supra note 22, at 101 (noting that prior to the enactment of the FAA, “a party
to an arbitration agreement could at any time prior to the award simply refuse to arbitrate
and courts would not enforce the agreement”).
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contracts.24 The Act states that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”25 In other words, arbitration
clauses should be enforced in the same way as any other contract, and they
also should be subject to the same defenses—such as duress,
unconscionability, or lack of consideration—that apply equally to all
contracts.
The principle that any rule treating arbitration clauses less favorably
than other contracts embodies a hostility to arbitration has become the
driving force in determining the FAA’s power to preempt state law. The
Supreme Court has held that Section 2 of the FAA, which makes arbitration
clauses enforceable, is substantive law that preempts and overrides
conflicting state law.26
The particular preemption paradigm in which the FAA operates is
known as “implied conflict preemption” or “implied obstacle
preemption.”27 Under this framework, the FAA preempts any “state-law
rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”28 Importantly, state laws need not expressly target arbitration,
as the FAA also preempts laws that are implicitly hostile to arbitration.
This means that the FAA preempts both rules that forbid arbitration
outright, as well as rules or contract principles “that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” 29 In addition, rules
that are generally applicable to all contracts but that target arbitration
through “more subtle methods” by interfering with arbitration’s
fundamental attributes also are preempted. 30 Interestingly, although the
original motivation for the FAA was to overcome judicial refusal to order
specific performance of arbitration agreements, courts have applied the
FAA to preempt state statutes and regulations in addition to judicially-

24

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
26
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
27
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (holding that the
FAA overrides “state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
FAA’s objectives”). In addition to conflict preemption, there are two other preemption
doctrines. The doctrine of “express preemption” applies when a federal statute contains an
express preemption provision, which is then applied in conformance with the statutory
language. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. St. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 203 (1983) (“Congress may preempt state authority by saying so in express terms.”).
In addition, field preemption occurs where Congress intended to entirely displace any state
regulation in a particular area. Id. at 204.
28
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
29
Id. at 339.
30
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
25
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created rules.31
As a result, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied
preemption principles to invalidate numerous state laws on the ground that
they subject arbitration clauses to less favorable treatment than other
contracts and thus conflict with the FAA. For example, courts have found
that the FAA preempts rules barring certain types of claims from
arbitration,32 laws that make arbitration agreements unenforceable when
they deprive individuals of the ability to vindicate their rights, 33 laws
designed to help consumers understand that a contract contains an
arbitration clause,34 laws that do not target arbitration specifically but that
only apply to certain categories of contracts,35 procedural rules relating to
who decides a dispute about the enforceability of an arbitration clause or
the level of appellate review an arbitration award can receive, 36 and public
policy doctrines that attempt to combat abusive practices in arbitration.37
See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (indicating that “state law,
whether of legislative or judicial origin” will be preempted if it singles out arbitration for
disfavored treatment and holding that the FAA preempted a provision of the California
Labor Code requiring a judicial forum for the resolution of wage disputes). See also Preston
v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008) (holding that the FAA preempts a state law granting a
state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate).
32
See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532 (2012) (finding
that the FAA preempted a West Virginia rule prohibiting mandatory arbitration of wrongful
death and personal injury claims against nursing homes).
33
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 (holding that “States cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons” and concluding that
even if a class action ban precludes individuals from vindicating their rights states cannot
preclude companies from including a class action ban in an arbitration clause).
34
See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
35
See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the FAA
preempted portions of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act because the act was
limited to consumers and therefore did not apply to all contracts).
36
See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 581–83 (2008) (holding that
the FAA precludes rules that expand the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award
beyond the grounds provided in the FAA itself); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (finding that FAA requires certain challenges to contracts
containing an arbitration clause to be decided by the arbitrator, notwithstanding state-law
rules to the contrary).
37
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351. Corporate organizations have pushed strongly for
the Supreme Court to hold that the FAA preempts state public policy doctrines meant to
promote fairness, when they are applied to arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Brief for Pac. Legal
Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12–13, Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v.
Moreno, 573 U.S. 904 (2014) (No. 13-856). Clarence Thomas has expressed some
sympathy to the view that the FAA preempts public policy defenses. See Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 352–57 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the FAA only permits challenges
to the formation of an arbitration clause rather than its enforceability, and that the Act would
preempt state rules that make arbitration clauses unenforceable on public policy grounds).
For one attempt to catalog the wide variety of state laws that courts have found preempted
by the FAA, see David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the
Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 154–
31
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The only type of law that will not be preempted, per the FAA’s
savings clause, is a law that is generally applicable to all contracts, namely
one that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 38
For example, a decision finding that an arbitration clause is unconscionable
generally will not be preempted because the doctrine of unconscionability
applies to all contracts.39 But even then, a generally applicable rule like
unconscionability may be preempted if applying it would interfere with
“fundamental attributes of arbitration.”40 For example, the Supreme Court
found that a state law declaring that certain arbitration clauses containing
class-action waivers were unconscionable and requiring that class claims be
resolvable in arbitration was preempted because class-wide proceedings
would conflict with arbitration’s fundamental attributes of a streamlined,
and procedurally flexible process.41 Additionally, a state rule may be
preempted if it is applied disproportionately to arbitration agreements in a
way that disfavors arbitration or affects fundamental attributes of
arbitration, because the disparate application may reflect back-door
hostility to arbitration relative to other contracts.42
Although these laws are preempted under the broad mantle that they
express hostility to arbitration, the general label of hostility can be broken
down into two categories. One category encompasses laws that reflect a
view that arbitration, or arbitration in a particular form, is inferior to
litigation. 43 For example, a rule requiring that all dispute resolution
59 (2004) (identifying forty-nine different state statutes that were found preempted by
judicial decisions from January 2002 to April 2004).
38
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). Thus, state law applies if it was enacted “to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
39
See generally Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why
Unconscionability Survives the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 2014 J. DISP.
RESOL. 225 (2014) (describing the state of the unconscionability defense after Concepcion
and explaining that generally applicable contract rules ordinarily are not preempted, unless
they interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v.
Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019) (explaining that neutral, non-discriminatory rules that
apply to all contracts, such as unconscionability, ordinarily are not preempted, but that they
can be preempted if they conflict with fundamental attributes of arbitration).
40
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.
41
Id. at 344–45.
42
Id. at 342 (indicating that a rule requiring judicially-monitored discovery could be
preempted because even though it is facially neutral, “the rule would have a
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements” and could interfere with arbitration’s
fundamental attributes).
43
See, e.g., Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 785 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (7th Cir.
2015) (describing the FAA as establishing that “judges should not allow any preference they
might have for judicial resolution of a legal dispute to override the parties’ disputeresolution preferences as embodied in an arbitration clause”); Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 801 (10th Cir. 1995) (Jenkins, J., concurring) (“I believe part of the
reason for the historical hostility towards arbitration agreements was the conventional
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proceedings, including arbitration, must follow the Federal Rules of
Evidence indicates a dissatisfaction with streamlined procedures and
expresses a preference to make arbitration more like litigation. The rule
may be generally applicable, but it evinces a suspicion of arbitration vis-àvis litigation. A second category encompasses laws that express no view
on the relative merits of arbitration versus litigation, but that treat
arbitration provisions differently from other contractual provisions. One
example is a law that requires arbitration clauses to appear on the front
page of a contract in bold print. 44 Both categories may be seen as
expressing hostility to arbitration, but for different reasons.
The courts’ willingness to apply the FAA to override a wide variety of
state laws that affect arbitration clauses is significant. The growing use of
mandatory arbitration clauses, particularly by large corporations that
impose mandatory arbitration as part of their non-negotiable standard-form
contracts with their customers and employees, is enormously controversial.
Critics of binding mandatory arbitration claim that it is inferior to litigation
because the arbitration system stacks the deck in favor of corporations at
the expense of consumers and employees. Arbitration opponents assert that
many corporations draft arbitration clauses with terms that are designed to
make it difficult or even impossible for individual claimants to succeed,
such as by barring aggregate litigation or class actions, shortening statutes
of limitations, requiring the parties to keep the arbitration proceedings
secret, and by limiting the ability of parties to seek discovery or obtain
necessary evidence to support their claims.45 They also argue that
wisdom that the litigation process was superior to alternative forms of dispute resolution,
such as arbitration.”); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774, 815 n.33 (NLRB 2014)
(Johnson, Board Member, dissenting) (“[T]he FAA precludes any court, or this Agency,
from regarding arbitration as inferior to litigation generally.”), overruled on other grounds
by Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
44
It is somewhat unclear whether such a law would be preempted, though it likely
would. The Supreme Court previously invalidated just such a law in Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). More recently, however, the Court opined in dicta
that state rules making arbitration agreements or specific provisions in those agreements
more prominently displayed might not be preempted. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.6.
45
See, e.g., F. PAUL BLAND ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 4–14
(NCLC 7th ed. 2014) (canvassing the various criticisms of binding mandatory arbitration).
The impact of class action bans is hard to understate. By one measure, in the financial
services sector alone, the use of class action bans has enriched corporations by more than
half a billion dollars per year. The CFPB, in a comprehensive study of arbitration
provisions in consumer financial services contracts, found that consumers who initiated
individual arbitrations in the years 2010–2011 received total relief of $172,433, and
$189,107 total debt forbearance. By contrast, during the period of 2008–2012, the study
found that class actions involving financial services products provided total relief of $540
million per year to an average of 70 million consumers a year. And that number does not
account for the additional value of any injunctive relief those class actions provided. See
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO
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arbitration creates a “repeat player bias” whereby arbitrators are inclined to
support the repeat player—most often the corporation—out of fear that
they will not be chosen by the company for future cases if they rule against
it, though evidence regarding the bias so far appears inconclusive. 46
Detractors point out that arbitrators act in secret, that arbitrators are not
bound to apply the law in the way that judges are, and that the FAA
provides for extremely limited judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision. 47
Some recent studies suggest that consumers and employees fare less well in
arbitration than they do in litigation. 48
By contrast, supporters assert that arbitration offers a faster, cheaper
and more efficient alternative to litigation.49 They note that arbitration
offers greater predictability to businesses, and helps reduce the passing of
litigation costs onto consumers through higher prices. 50 Supporters argue
that arbitration may increase access to justice for many individuals who
may find that they cannot seek redress in court because litigation has

DODD -FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), §§ 1.4.3–
1.4.7 (Mar. 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-studyreport-to-congress-2015.pdf [hereinafter “CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY”].
46
See e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223
(1998); BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 1.3.3 (“There is some empirical evidence and a good
deal of commentary suggesting that arbitrators do, in fact, have a tendency to favor ‘repeat
player’ clients.”). But see SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION PRELIMINARY REPORT 13–16 (Mar. 2009),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Searle%20Civil%20Justice%20
Institute%20Report%20on%20Consumer%20Arbitration.pdf (finding no statistically
significant repeat-player effect in its analysis of American Arbitration Association data and
ascribing any repeat-player effect to better case screening by repeat-players than to
arbitrator bias).
47
Section 10 of the FAA provides the grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s award.
Those grounds are mostly limited to whether the award resulted from corruption or fraud, or
if the arbitrators grossly exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018). The Supreme Court
has interpreted the grounds for vacating an award extremely narrowly. See, e.g., Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2002).
48
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
49
See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in
Consumer Contracts, 17TH ANN. CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES INST. 221–22 (2012) (describing
one study of arbitration participants showing that a majority thought that arbitration was
faster, cheaper and simpler than going to court); Dwight Golann, Developments in
Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988) (“The primary
advantage for consumers in binding arbitration is that it offers at least the possibility of a
faster and cheaper decisionmaking mechanism for their complaints.”).
50
See, e.g., The “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007”: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 12–13 (2007) (testimony of Peter B. Rutledge)
(arguing that eliminating mandatory arbitration would “increase the costs of dispute
resolution, and a portion of these costs would be passed onto employees (in the form of
lower wages), consumers (in the form of higher prices) and investors (in the form of lower
share prices)”).
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become too expensive and time consuming. 51
Ordinarily, if some legal principle, rule, or regime is considered
flawed or unfair in particular ways, state legislatures, state agencies, and
courts can correct those flaws through legislation, regulation, and commonlaw rule making. For example, if state legislators believe that arbitration
provides insufficient discovery and thus prevents consumers from proving
their claims, or that arbitration is too costly and so consumers cannot afford
it, an ordinary response would be to enact laws allowing for greater
discovery in arbitration or limiting arbitration costs. But under current
doctrine, that is precisely what the FAA bars courts from doing, because
such laws arguably reflect a belief that arbitration is an inferior alternative
to litigation absent such protections.
As FAA preemption broadens, corporate parties have greater freedom
to design their arbitration clauses however they want without being subject
to any state regulation designed to counteract their most self-interested
impulses. Businesses and organizations acting on behalf of business have
aggressively pushed courts to give the FAA an ever-broader preemptive
effect so as to displace a greater body of state laws that attempt to regulate
arbitration. Thanks in large part to the litigation strategies of business
interests, the Supreme Court’s view of what counts as hostility to
arbitration has expanded in recent years, particularly in the area of class
actions.52
Thus, states have very limited power to regulate arbitration. Even
consumer groups and other advocacy groups that have drafted model state
laws related to arbitration have recognized how powerfully the FAA (as
currently interpreted) limits state power to engage in legislative reform. 53
For example, the National Consumer Law Center’s Model Act is just as
notable for what it does not do as for what it does do. It does not invalidate
mandatory arbitration as to any specific type of claim, does not require the
imposition of any specific contract terms to make arbitration clauses fairer,
nor indicate that arbitration is inferior to litigation for resolving particular
51

See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–
64 (2001) (claiming that mandatory arbitration actually expands opportunities by giving
plaintiffs the ability to bring cases that they could not bring in court); see also Circuit City,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2000) (“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the
costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation,
which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial
contracts.”).
52
See Stipanowich, supra note 6, at 325–26.
53
The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) has drafted a “Model State Consumer
& Employee Justice Enforcement Act” that addresses mandatory arbitration. DAVID
SELIGMANN, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE MODEL STATE CONSUMER & EMPLOYEE JUSTICE
ENFORCEMENT ACT (2015).
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types of claims. That is likely because such provisions would create a
significant risk of being preempted.54 Rather it focuses on contracts of
companies that do business with the state, claims involving public
injunctions, defining and applying general unconscionability principles to
arbitration clauses, and requiring clear notice of the presence of an
arbitration clause in standard form contracts.55
The principle of hostility to arbitration as a touchstone of preemption
has expanded so widely that it has become unmoored from its original
conception. The original form of hostility that the FAA drafters were
responding to was judicial refusal to enforce arbitration clauses for any
reason. The drafters did not say that arbitration was always superior (or at
least equivalent) to litigation, or that arbitration could never operate in an
unfair or flawed manner. There is a big gap between saying that
legislatures and courts cannot prohibit arbitration altogether and saying that
legislatures and courts cannot regulate arbitration to make it fair and
balanced for both parties. But current FAA preemption doctrine equates
the two.
Yet, hostility to arbitration is not expressed only by state legislatures
and courts. Corporations also express hostility to arbitration in multiple
ways. This article examines how corporate parties express hostility to
arbitration by carving out certain claims, remedies and procedures from
their arbitration provisions. Comparing this “corporate hostility” to
arbitration to the various kinds of state-government hostility to arbitration
that the FAA treats as preempted is instructive in evaluating how far FAA
preemption doctrine should reach. This corporate hostility to arbitration is
described in the next section.
III. CORPORATE HOSTILITY TO ARBITRATION
At the same time that corporations argue that state laws regulating
arbitration are hostile to arbitration and therefore preempted, they also
express their own corporate hostility to arbitration in the way that they draft
their arbitration clauses. They do so by deciding which disputes will be
arbitrated, under which conditions, and utilizing which procedures. Most
commonly, a company’s hostility to arbitration is represented in the form
of a carve out. A carve out is where a party includes an arbitration clause
in its contract but “carves out” certain claims from arbitration—such as
claims for injunctive relief, claims for collection of unpaid debts, or claims
to protect trade secrets—and reserves disputes regarding those claims for

54
See id. at 12–15 (describing the scope and limits of FAA preemption as background
for understanding what areas the model act covers).
55
See id.
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litigation. 56 In addition, a company may establish specific procedures for
arbitration that bring it closer to litigation, say by providing for expanded
discovery or requiring the arbitration proceeding to comply with the rules
of evidence. I refer to this conduct as “corporate hostility” because most
arbitration clauses are drafted by companies, either in standard-form
adhesion contracts with consumers and employees, or in their contracts
with other companies.57
At the outset, it is worth clarifying that there is nothing inherently
wrong about expressing hostility to arbitration. The decision to carve out a
particular dispute from an arbitration clause simply reflects a judgment by
the drafting party that litigation is a superior mechanism to arbitration for
resolving that particular dispute. Similarly, adding specific procedural
requirements that approximate court procedures may reflect a judgment
that judicial-type processes may be preferable to the traditional streamlined
arbitration process in certain circumstances. At its broadest level, every
decision a company makes about whether to use an arbitration clause, or
about the terms of the arbitration clause, reflects a value judgment about
the relative merits of arbitration vis-à-vis litigation or the company’s
comfort level with arbitral-type proceedings. A corporation’s decision to
use an arbitration clause at all may indicate that it feels that, on the whole,
arbitration is a superior form of dispute resolution for the corporation as
compared to litigation. And vice versa, a decision not to use an arbitration
clause may reflect a preference for litigation over arbitration. 58 A company
that uses an arbitration clause in its contracts with consumers but not in its
contracts with other corporations (a frequent practice) 59 may indicate that
the company thinks that arbitration is inferior to litigation for disputes that
are likely to arise with other corporations but that arbitration is superior for
the types of disputes likely to arise with consumers. In short, companies
may have various reasons for preferring one form of dispute resolution to
another. That is normal and expected.
This understanding that parties to an agreement will always express
some hostility to either arbitration or litigation is implicit in courts’ analysis
of the FAA. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it is a
56

See infra Part III.A.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (documenting the wide range of large
companies that utilize contracts requiring parties to submit disputes to binding arbitration).
58
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336 (2007) (suggesting that corporations’ decisions
not to use an arbitration clause indicates that those actors “prefer litigation to arbitration,
encounter obstacles to negotiating mutually satisfactory contract terms that include
arbitration clauses, or some combination of these factors”).
59
See infra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
57
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fundamental principle of the FAA that “arbitration is a matter of
contract,”60 and that one of the main benefits of arbitration is that it
“afford[s] parties discretion in designing arbitration processes” that are
“tailored to the type of dispute.”61 When choosing specific “arbitration
processes” or specific claims that will be subject to arbitration, the contract
drafter is making a value judgment that the terms it imposes are preferable
to the terms it rejects, and that the selected terms best serve its interest.
Courts have defined hostility, within the meaning of the FAA, as a
preference for litigation over arbitration. 62 Under that definition, it is
impossible to have choice without also having hostility. In short, the
essence of private, contracted-for dispute resolution is a preference for one
form of dispute resolution and therefore, by definition, a hostility to the
other.
Similarly, when the federal government has regulated arbitration
(since it does not have to worry about preemption), it normally has done so
by carving out specific types of claims from the FAA’s reach. For
example, Congress has restricted the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements for whistleblower retaliation claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX),63 in home mortgage loans,64 in consumer credit contracts to
active duty military personnel or their dependents, 65 in contracts between
franchised auto dealers and auto manufacturers,66 and in contracts between
poultry farmers and purchasers. 67 Additionally, the FAA itself expresses
hostility to arbitration by carving out contracts of employment for workers
engaged in interstate commerce as exempt from the Act.68
60

Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
62
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
63
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2018).
64
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2018).
65
10 U.S.C. § 987(e)-(f) (2018).
66
15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2018).
67
7 U.S.C. § 197c (2018); see also Cole, supra note 3, at 780 (stating that when
Congress has regulated arbitration, it “has taken a piecemeal approach, proposing
amendments to exempt certain kinds of disputes from the FAA” rather than changing the
arbitration process itself).
68
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (stating that the FAA does not apply to “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”). Many scholars believe that this provision was intended to
exempt all employment contracts from the Act. See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 18, at 191–92
(examining the history surrounding the adoption of the FAA and concluding that the drafters
intended to exempt all workplace disputes from the Act); Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’
Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification,
17 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996) (same). The Supreme Court, however, held that
section 1 only exempts contracts with workers who work directly in interstate commerce,
such as interstate transportation workers. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
109 (2001). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court also recently clarified that the provision
61
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If hostility to arbitration means, as courts have held, a view that
arbitration is inferior to litigation, then corporations express a significant
amount of hostility to arbitration. This section looks at two forms of
corporate hostility to arbitration. One type is where corporations use carveouts or other provisions to indicate that they see litigation as superior to
arbitration for certain disputes. The second type is where companies use
arbitration clauses to express hostility toward both arbitration and
litigation—i.e., where the goal of the arbitration clause is not to move a
dispute from court to arbitration, but to prevent the dispute from being
addressed in any forum. This section suggests that both forms of corporate
hostility are intended to promote the corporation’s private self-interest,
often at the expense of the potential opposing party in any dispute. Finally,
it places these corporate practices within the context of the landscape of
current litigation involving carve-outs.
A. Contracts that Reflect a View that Arbitration Is Inferior to
Litigation for Resolving Certain Disputes
First, many companies express hostility to arbitration by carving out
various types of claims from their arbitration clauses. These carve-outs
indicate that companies believe arbitration to be inferior to litigation for
resolving some types of disputes. Professors Christopher Drahozal and
Erin O’Connor studied arbitration clauses from various contractual settings
to see what kinds of claims were commonly carved out.69 They found that
arbitration clauses commonly carved out (a) claims for injunctive relief; (b)
claims to protect confidential information, such as trade secrets; (c) claims
that could affect the rights of third parties, such as in rem adjudications;
and (d) claims for money owed, such as debt collections.70 The majority of
arbitration provisions they examined had some form of carve-out. In some
sectors, nearly all the arbitration clauses had a carve-out.71 They also found
that where there is a large disparity in bargaining power between the
parties, “carve-outs will appear at very high rates.”72 This fact suggests
that the greater leverage the drafting party has, the more likely the party is

covers both employees and independent contractors who work in interstate commerce. New
Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 542–43 (2019).
69
Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: CarveOuts from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1951 (2014) [hereinafter “Drahozal &
O’Connor”].
70
Id. at 1967–68.
71
Id. at 1967 (“Carve-outs are present in essentially all franchise contract arbitration
clauses, nearly two-thirds of domestic and cross-border technology contract arbitration
clauses, and about one-half of domestic joint venture agreement arbitration clauses and CEO
employment contract arbitration clauses.”).
72
Id. at 1968.
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to include a carve-out. In turn, this suggests that companies include carveouts in their arbitration clauses because they perceive carve-outs as
advantageous or in their self-interest.
These carve-outs likely indicate a preference for litigation over
arbitration for specific types of claims. For example, the fact that
companies often exempt claims for injunctive relief reflects that courts may
be better suited than arbitrators for issuing, enforcing, and monitoring
injunctions. Court have clearly defined structures for granting emergency
relief, such as temporary restraining orders, that offer greater reliability
than arbitration. 73 Courts can award emergency relief almost immediately.
In arbitration, such relief must await appointment of an arbitrator, and that
appointment can be delayed by the party opposing emergency relief. 74
Similarly, companies carve out injunctive claims because they believe
that “courts can more efficiently and effectively resolve disputes involving
requests for injunctive relief.”75 Courts have greater institutional powers,
including contempt power, to ensure enforcement of an injunction. 76
Courts also may have a greater ability than arbitrators—whose authority
comes from the parties to the dispute—to enforce injunctive relief that may
affect the rights of third parties.77 Further, arbitrators may lack the
authority to provide oversight and monitoring of an ongoing injunctive
decree, and may also lack the ability to modify, dissolve, or amend an
existing injunction.78 Unlike courts, which retain continuing jurisdiction
over final injunctive relief, an arbitrator’s authority often ends at the
conclusion of the proceeding, and thus the only way to affect an ongoing
injunction would be to initiate a new arbitration proceeding. 79 Given how
cumbersome these procedures are, parties may sensibly conclude that
arbitration is an inferior venue to court for addressing claims for injunctive
relief.

73
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (Or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 456 (2010) (“[C]ourts also
are better suited than arbitrators to grant emergency relief, such as a temporary restraining
order (TRO).”); see also id. at 436 (stating that emergency relief is something “arbitration is
ill-suited to provide”).
74
Id. at 457.
75
Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1993.
76
Id. at 1971 (“Arbitrators have the authority to order injunctive relief, but without the
contempt power of the courts, an arbitrator’s award may prove ineffective.”).
77
See, e.g., Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999) (discussing
how third parties may not be able to benefit from an injunction ordered by an arbitrator); see
also Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1967–68 (noting that carve-outs are often used
for claims that could affect the rights of third-parties to the dispute).
78
See, e.g., Broughton, 988 P.2d at 77 (describing arbitrators’ limitations with respect
to injunctive relief).
79
See id.
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Claims for the protection of trade secrets and confidential information,
protection of intellectual property, or the enforcement of non-compete
clauses are often carved out from arbitration. 80 In part, this is because the
primary remedy in those disputes is injunctive relief, “a remedy that courts
are more effective at providing.”81 Even as to the underlying merits of
intellectual property disputes, such carve-outs can indicate that the
company views the right to litigate in court rather than arbitrate as a
“legitimate commercial need,” and that courts provide an “extra margin of
safety” with respect to intellectual property claims that arbitrators do not. 82
Claims for money owed, such as debt collection or failure to pay on a
loan, also are commonly carved out of arbitration clauses. 83 Parties
drafting arbitration clauses may perceive debt collection and loan cases as
ones where the law is generally clear and well-defined. 84 In such cases,
parties may be suspicious of arbitration because they fear that arbitrators
are less likely to follow the law and more likely to split the difference
between the parties.85 When the law is clear, arbitrator expertise is less
necessary, and arbitration may be less efficient and more expensive,
because parties must take the additional step of confirming the arbitration
award in court before the award is final and binding.86 In fact, studies of
business-to-business loan and credit contracts show that loan contracts are
unlikely to include arbitration provisions at all, because the disputes are
likely to be clear and courts have substantial experience with them. 87
Companies also tend to carve out claims where the company is more
likely to be the plaintiff and the consumer or employee is more likely to be
the defendant, while still requiring arbitration for claims where the
company is likely to be the defendant. In debt collection claims,
companies tend to be plaintiffs and the consumers tend to be defendants. 88
80

See, e.g., Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016) (contract
required arbitration of all disputes “[e]xcept for disputes relating to intellectual property
rights, obligations, or any infringement claims”).
81
Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1967.
82
Tompkins, 840 F.3d at 1031.
83
Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1968; see also Cain v. Midland Funding,
LLC, 156 A.3d 307 (Md. 2017) (arbitration clause allowed lender to bring collection action
against credit card debtor in small claims court).
84
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 456, 460–61.
85
See id.
86
Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1968; Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at
456.
87
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 460–61 (citing Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to
Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 231
(2000) (“Most loan contracts are relatively clear, and courts have a great deal of experience
with them.”)).
88
See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 97 (2001) (explaining that debt collection
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Moreover, many debt collection claims result in default judgments, and
companies prefer courts because they can more quickly and easily obtain
and enforce those judgments against debtors.89 Similarly, many arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts will carve out claims for self-help
repossession of homes, automobiles, or other purchases, or for enforcement
of non-compete clauses. 90 Some clauses are even more explicit and simply
give the drafting party the right to pursue any claim in court while requiring
the consumer or employee to submit any disputes to arbitration. 91
Such clauses evince a corporate hostility to arbitration as a plaintiff
but a preference for arbitration as a defendant. That may mean that
companies employing such carve-outs perceive arbitration as
systematically favoring defendants and as being an inferior alternative to
litigation for plaintiffs. Such a view is not surprising, as there are various
ways in which arbitration may favor defendants. For example, arbitration
does not provide for nearly as much discovery as litigation (unless the
parties agree to import litigation-like discovery procedures into arbitration),
which makes it harder for the plaintiff to build his or her case. 92
Companies also are likely to carve out disputes that carry a risk of
high damages awards, or “bet the company” cases. 93 And they do so
because they feel that arbitration is ill-suited to address large-dollar claims,
in part because of the risk of a high-dollar award combined with
arbitration’s extreme limitations on appellate review. 94 When it comes to
cases that have potentially large stakes from the company’s perspective,
and repossession actions comprise nearly all the claims that a lender will affirmatively assert
against a borrower).
89
See id. at 97–98.
90
See id. at 97 (“For example, some consumer credit agreements require arbitration of
all claims except for: (1) collection actions; and (2) actions to preserve, repossess or
foreclose on collateral.”). See also Brief of Appellee Option One Mortg. Corp. at 33-35,
Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115 (2007) (No. 50 EAP 2005), 2006 WL
2923022 (listing numerous examples of arbitration clauses that carved out foreclosure and
repossession claims).
91
See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, §§ 5.3.1, 6.7.3 (giving examples of cases involving
non-mutual arbitration clauses); White v. ACell, Inc., 779 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (6th Cir.
2019) (allowing the employer, but not the employee, to bring certain claims for injunctive
relief in court).
92
See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 61 (“The unavailability of discovery skews the
system in favor of the corporate defendant. The plaintiff has the burden of production of
evidence, much of which the defendant may well possess . . . . The combination of these
factors make[s] arbitration a highly attractive alternative to litigation for corporate
defendants in many circumstances.”).
93
See Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1992; Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73,
at 436.
94
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350–51 (2011)
(“Arbitration is poorly suited to the high stakes of class litigation . . . . We find it hard to
believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review . . . .”).
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companies often want “the full panoply of procedural protection afforded
by court and full appeal rights” and thus prefer litigation. 95 Companies
may worry about a large award that could have a potentially devastating
effect on its bottom line. 96 At the same time, however, companies routinely
use arbitration clauses that prohibit consumers from bringing class actions,
and instead require individualized arbitrations. 97 In defending arbitration in
general and class action bans in particular, companies and other supporters
of arbitration tout that arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation, in no
small part because of the limited ability to appeal an arbitration award, as
appeals add both substantial cost, time, and uncertainty to a case. 98
While this might not seem noteworthy at first blush, such carve-outs
express significant hostility to arbitration. In essence, these carve-outs
indicate that the more important a company considers a case to be, the
more that arbitration is inferior to the courts for deciding it. Stating that
arbitration is acceptable only for cases that do not matter—and not for
cases that do matter—conflicts with the view that arbitration is just as good
as litigation for resolving disputes.
In addition to situations where drafting parties carve out specific
substantive claims from the arbitration provision, they also may use carveouts to avoid the procedural aspects of arbitration that they find inferior to
litigation. Procedural carve-outs include situations where companies
require arbitration for most disputes but import litigation-type procedures
95

Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 454.
Id. at 455 (quoting Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a
Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2008)). There is a level of
hypocrisy about this that feels troubling. This carve-out prioritizes only cases that are largestakes or important to the company, not ones that are important to the individual plaintiff. A
case that involves small dollars for the company’s perspective may be immensely valuable
to the consumer. Also, that does not even consider the dignitary interests the consumer has
in having his or her case decided fairly and accurately. While companies can preserve
appellate rights for judgments that may hurt them, however, the consumer or employee does
not get the opportunity to carve out claims where an adverse judgment would be devastating
to that individual. This includes cases like bankruptcy that have a dramatic effect on an
individuals’ future. See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 4.3.3 (identifying the debate around
what types of claims asserted in bankruptcy can be subject to mandatory arbitration).
97
The CFPB found that in the financial services sector eighty-five percent of contracts
with arbitration agreements, which accounted for ninety-nine percent of overall market
share, contained class action bans. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at 10.
Another study found that all the business-to-consumer arbitration clauses it studied
contained a class action ban. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008).
98
See, e.g., David K. Taylor, Binding Arbitration: Limited Appeal Rights – Finality Is
the Rule, CONSTRUCTION AND PROCUREMENT L. NEWS (June 1, 2016), https://www.bradley.c
om/insights/publications/2016/06/binding-arbitration-limited-appeal-rights-finality-is-therule (explaining that parties in the construction industry like limited appeal rights because it
provides for finality).
96
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into the arbitration process. By doing so, the drafting party signals that it
finds the procedural informality and flexibility of arbitration to be inferior
to litigation and prefers to make arbitration look more like judicial dispute
resolution.
For example, just as companies may carve out particular types of
disputes that carry a risk of high damages awards, they may also use a
procedural carve-out for high-stakes claims by providing for expanded
appeal rights in cases where an award meets or exceeds a particular dollar
threshold.99
Additionally, companies use procedural carve-outs by
engrafting litigation-like procedures for certain claims (like high-dollar
claims), including procedures for expanded discovery and stricter rules of
evidence. In the business-to-business context, it is becoming more
common for companies to opt for expanded discovery rather than limited
discovery. Studies of contemporary arbitration provisions indicate that
“proceedings under standard arbitration rules are likely to include
prehearing motion practice and extensive discovery” and that “[a]rbitration
hearings are now often preceded by extensive discovery, including
depositions.”100 Parties may also dictate that the Federal Rules of Evidence
will apply to any arbitration proceedings. 101
99

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings Co., LLC, 353 P.3d 741 (Cal. 2015)
(addressing this type of arbitration clause). In addition, while courts traditionally review
arbitration awards under a highly deferential standards, see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (listing the
limited grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award), some companies had provided
that courts must review arbitration awards de novo and without the benefit of traditional
deference. Carroll E. Neesmann, Contracting for Judicial Review: Party-Chosen Arbitral
Review Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Process, and Is Good for Arbitration,
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18–19 (1998). The Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that the
FAA prohibits parties from contracting for expanded judicial review or from changing the
level of deference afforded to an arbitrator’s decision. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
100
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
6, 12 (2010). See also Lawrence W. Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the
Predictability of Procedures, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2009) (noting that business
arbitration “has become more similar to litigation—particularly US-style litigation in United
States courts—in large part because of increased procedural activity, including discovery”);
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
arbitration clause that stated: “In any such arbitration, the parties shall be entitled to
discovery in the same manner as if the dispute was being litigated in Los Angeles Superior
Court.”).
101
The American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) Dispute Resolution Service, for
example, provides sample language for companies that wish to require arbitrators to follow
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Guide to Arbitration Clauses, AHLA DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SERVICE 7, https://www.healthlawyers.org/dr/Documents/Guide%20to%20Arb
itration%20Clauses.pdf (last visited July 12, 2019) (“Sample language: The arbitrator will
admit into evidence only documents and testimony that would be admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.”). See also John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses:
Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, DISP. RESOL. J. 4 (Feb.–Apr. 2003) (describing arbitration
clause that stated: “The arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules
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These procedural carve-outs also reveal strong hostility to arbitration
and reflect the belief that arbitration leads to less accurate and trustworthy
decisions than litigation. From the company’s perspective, a primary
benefit of arbitration is reducing costs. But it does so at the expense of
accuracy. “Narrow discovery rights and evidence rules tend to enable the
parties to conserve dispute resolution costs at the expense of accuracy,
while broader discovery rights and evidence rules increase the cost of
dispute resolution but can increase accuracy.”102 Companies may choose to
accept that cost reduction and ensuing loss of accuracy when the case is not
important to them, but their priorities switch when the case is important.
Consumers and employees, however, do not get to make this choice, as
they lack the ability to bargain over the terms of the arbitration agreement
that companies impose on them, and thus are often stuck with arbitration
regardless of how important the case is to them. 103
Procedural carve-outs are not limited to high-dollar claims.
Companies sometimes use carve-outs for small-dollar claims too. As with
debt-collection claims, companies may be more likely to carve out smalldollar claims when the company is more likely to be the plaintiff than the
defendant. In the consumer financial services context, a common carve-out
is one that permits either party to bring claims of $1,500 or less in smallclaims court rather than in arbitration. 104 The CFPB found in its study that
most of the arbitration clauses it reviewed contained a small-claims carveout.105 In several product markets, small-claims carve-outs were included
in eighty to ninety-three percent of arbitration clauses. 106 Interestingly, the
CFPB found that corporations were much more likely to bring claims
against consumers in small-claims court than consumers were to bring

of Civil Procedure applicable in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, and the arbitrators shall follow the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
102
Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1963.
103
Another explanation is that companies only would want to absorb the extra costs of
discovery and evidentiary rules when the case has sufficient financial stakes to make those
costs worthwhile. But even if that is true, it does not change the fact that companies find that
importing litigation procedures helps promote accuracy, and that litigation procedures are
superior to arbitration procedures for producing a correct outcome.
104
See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,835 n.71 (May 24, 2016) (codified at
12 C.F.R. 1040) (“[M]ost arbitration agreements in consumer financial contracts contain a
‘small claims court carve-out’ that provides the parties with a contractual right to pursue a
claim in small claims court.”) (quoting CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at 33–
34)).
105
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at § 1.4.6 (“Most arbitration clauses that
we reviewed contained small claims court carve-outs”).
106
More specifically, 93% of payday loan arbitration clauses, 85% of mobile wireless
arbitration clauses, 83% of private student loan arbitration clauses, 59% of checking account
arbitration clauses, and 66.7% of credit card arbitration clauses contained small claims court
carve-outs. Id. § 2.5.2.
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claims in small-claims court against companies. 107 In the jurisdictions the
agency examined, consumers brought 870 small-claims actions in 2012,
while corporations brought 41,000 small-claims actions, almost all of
which were debt collection actions. 108
The areas that Drahozal and O’Connor studied, with the exception of
cell-phone service contracts, fell outside the consumer context, a context
where standard-form, non-negotiable arbitration clauses are common. 109
But carve-outs are also common in the consumer and employment contexts.
Business-to-consumer arbitration clauses might carve out claims related to
debt collection, 110 mortgage foreclosure and repossession,111 claims that are
small enough to proceed in small-claims court,112 and claims for injunctive
relief.113
In addition, in the consumer and employment contexts,
corporations express a more troubling hostility to arbitration—by inserting
terms that are designed to prevent consumers and employees from
vindicating their rights in any forum, including arbitration. These
provisions are discussed below.
B. Claim-Suppressing Arbitration Provisions
Some arbitration clauses that appear to be expressing a preference for
arbitration over litigation are in fact expressing a hostility to any form of
dispute resolution at all. The goal of these provisions is not to shift dispute
resolution from court to arbitration but to prevent plaintiffs from
vindicating their rights in any forum. This occurs where companies choose
arbitration because they can design their arbitration clauses in such a way
to make it virtually impossible for an injured consumer or employee to
bring a claim in arbitration. If aggrieved parties are required to arbitrate,
but the arbitration provision makes it infeasible for aggrieved individual to
bring a claim, then corporate defendants are essentially unaccountable for
their misconduct. Professor David Schwartz describes these types of
provisions as “claim-suppressing” arbitration provisions.114
107
See id. § 1.4.6 (revealing credit card issuers were “significantly more likely” to sue
consumers than the other way around).
108
Id.
109
See, e.g., Szalai, supra note 8, at 236. (stating that “the use of arbitration clauses in
non-negotiable, adhesionary contracts is widespread in American society” and that
meaningful consent and choice “is often lacking in consumer arbitration agreements”).
110
See Ware, supra note 88, at 97.
111
See supra notes 88–89, and accompanying text.
112
See Ware, supra note 90, and accompanying text.
113
See, e.g., White v. ACell, Inc., 779 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 2019) (describing
employment arbitration agreement that allowed the employer to bring certain claims for
injunctive relief in court).
114
See David Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J.
239, 240 (2012) (describing the current arbitration system as follows: “It is claim-
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The most high-profile example is an arbitration clause that prohibits
parties from proceeding in a class action or other joint proceeding and
instead requires individual arbitrations. Class action bans are extremely
prevalent in consumer contracts.115 While the company may appear to be
signaling that it finds individual arbitration preferable to class litigation,
often the class action bans are used because companies know that injured
consumers will not bring individual claims in arbitration. 116 For the types
of high-volume, small-dollar injuries that companies often inflict on
consumers, individual claims are not feasible, and a class action is the only
way to ensure that those injuries can be redressed. 117 Thus, courts have
referred to arbitration clauses that ban class actions as “get out of jail free”
cards for companies. 118 These clauses do not reflect a preference for the
arbitral forum. Rather, they reflect an attempt to keep disputes out of any
forum at all.
Claim-suppressing carve-outs are not limited to class action bans.
Companies have used arbitration clauses to prohibit individuals from
bringing claims for public injunctions in any forum (either court or
arbitration), and then have argued that the FAA preempts state-law rules
requiring that such claims be available in some forum. 119 Companies also
suppressing arbitration. It is designed and intended to suppress claims, both in size and
number.”).
115
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
116
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s study of arbitration clauses found that
although tens of millions of consumers are subject to arbitration clauses with financial
services companies, on average only 411 individual arbitrations were filed per year, and
most of those involved higher-dollar claims that were feasible on an individual basis. See
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at § 1.4.3; see also Judith Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of
Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804 (2015) (“The result has been the mass production of
arbitration clauses without a mass of arbitrations. Although hundreds of millions of
consumers and employees are obliged to use arbitration as their remedy, almost none do sorendering arbitration not a vindication but an unconstitutional evisceration of statutory and
common law rights.”).
117
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”).
118
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also
Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the Arbitration
Field Hearing, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-arbitratio
n-field-hearing-20151007 (describing class-action bans as giving companies a “free pass”).
119
See, e.g., Alison Frankel, The 9th Circuit Just Blew up Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Cases, REUTERS (July 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otcinjunction/the-9th-circuit-just-blew-up-mandatory-arbitration-in-consumer-casesidUSKCN1TW3O0 (describing arguments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other
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use more subtle methods to suppress claims. Provisions that may appear to
reflect an attempt to make dispute resolution faster or cheaper in reality
may be attempting to suppress or limit claims altogether. Such provisions
include distant forums,120 shortened statute of limitations from a matter of
years to a matter of weeks, 121 loser-pays rules (where the losing party pays
attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party), 122 and limitations on
awarding statutory or punitive damages. 123 Those types of provisions
either make it too difficult or risky for a consumer to bring a claim in
arbitration, or they reduce the potential arbitration award to such a degree
that the benefit of bringing a claim in arbitration is not worth the cost. To
be sure, courts have found unconscionable some of the most abusive
examples of these provisions (at least outside the class-action context
where the Supreme Court has indicated that class action bans can be
enforced no matter how claim-suppressing they might be), 124
corporate groups that a California rule prohibiting arbitration clauses that ban plaintiffs from
bringing public injunction actions in either court or arbitration is inconsistent with the
FAA).
120
See, e.g., Willis v. Nationwide Debt Settlement Grp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1221 (D.
Or. 2012) (provision requiring Oregon residents to travel to San Joaquin County, California,
is unconscionable).
121
See, e.g., Zaborowski v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1153 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (arbitration clause set six-month statute of limitations); Samaniego v. Empire
Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (arbitration clause set sixmonth statute of limitations); Potiyevskiy v. TM Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 IL App
(1st) 131864-U, at *6, *8 (Ill. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (arbitration clause set ten-day statute
of limitations); Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1197 (Wash. 2013)
(arbitration clause reduced statute of limitations from several years to thirty days); Hill v.
Garda CL Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635, 638 (Wash. 2013) (arbitration clause reduced statute of
limitations to fourteen days).
122
See e.g., Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2013)
(arbitration clause contained “loser pays” provision); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1154
(arbitration “losers pays” provision); Winston v. Academi Training Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12-CV767, 2013 WL 989999, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2013) (refusing to enforce arbitration
provision that required plaintiffs to pay all fees and costs even though the False Claims Act
allows prevailing plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137
Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 799–800 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (arbitration provision required
employee to pay employer’s attorneys’ fees if employer prevailed, but did not require
employer to pay employee’s fees if employee prevailed); Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters.,
Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1200–01 (Wash. 2013) (striking down “loser pays” rule as
unconscionable as applied to the plaintiff).
123
See, e.g., Newton, 549 F. App’x at 694 (arbitration clause precludes certain
statutorily authorized damages); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (arbitration provision
barred punitive damages); Ajamian, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798–99 (arbitration provision
precluded arbitrators from awarding special or punitive damages, but permitted the
corporate party to recover liquidated damages on top of other damages); Franks v. Bowers,
116 So. 3d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 2013) (arbitration clause precluded damages awardable under
the state’s Medical Malpractice Act); Brown v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948, 955
(Wash. 2013) (same).
124
See Frankel, supra note 39, at 242–49 (cataloging and discussing cases).
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notwithstanding defendants’ arguments that the FAA preempts state
unconscionability doctrine. But these examples highlight that many
companies use these provisions not because they like the arbitration
process, but because these provisions can help them avoid being subjected
to any dispute resolution process at all.
Corporations’ use of anti-severability provisions in conjunction with
claim-suppressing provisions like class action bans reveal another layer of
corporate hostility to arbitration. While some arbitration provisions include
severability clauses—clauses that state that if one portion of the arbitration
clause is declared unenforceable, the rest of the clause will remain valid
and binding125—it also is common for companies to use an anti-severability
clause. These clauses state that if a particular aspect of the arbitration
provision is invalidated, the entire arbitration clause shall be eliminated,
and parties will be free to bring any disputes in court.
Anti-severability clauses are quite revealing and indicate that, as a
general matter, companies find arbitration inferior to litigation. When a
company drafts an arbitration clause and inserts it into its contracts, the
company is not saying that arbitration is preferable to litigation without
qualification. It is saying that it finds arbitration superior under the specific
conditions and limitations that it has written into its arbitration provision.
An anti-severability clause shows that if a court were to declare one or
more of those conditions invalid or unenforceable, the drafting party no
longer considers arbitration to be superior to litigation and would prefer to
use the court system.
Anti-severability provisions are common and often are used in
conjunction with a class action ban.126 For example, in the recent Supreme
Court case of DIRECTV v. Imburgia,127 DIRECTV’s arbitration clause
stated that if the class action ban were to be found unenforceable, then the
entire arbitration clause would become unenforceable. 128 Through this
125

See, e.g., Citi 2017 Employment Arbitration Policy at 67, para. 28 (on file with
author) (“If any part or provision of this Policy is held to be invalid, illegal or
unenforceable, such holding won’t affect the legality, validity or enforceability of the
remaining parts and each provision of this Policy will be valid, legal and enforceable to the
fullest extent permitted by law.”).
126
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at § 1.4.1 (finding that many of the
arbitration clauses used in consumer financial services contracts included an antiseverability provision in conjunction with a class action ban); Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin,
supra note 97, at 884–85 (finding that 60% of class action waivers in consumer arbitration
clauses that the author studied contained an anti-severability provision).
127
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
128
Id. at 469–71 (describing and interpreting an anti-severability clause used by
DIRECTV which stated, in relevant part, “‘[i]f . . . the law of your state would find this
agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this [arbitration
provision] is unenforceable’”); see also JP Morgan Chase NA Arbitration Agreement (2019)
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provision, DIRECTV expressed a hostility to any mandatory arbitration—
individualized or joint—unless the arbitration clause contained a class
action ban. The reason that anti-severability clauses are so common is that
many corporations are fearful of, and hostile to, class arbitration. In fact,
corporations have been quite clear that while they dislike class actions, they
dislike class arbitration even more. Companies find that class litigation,
with its procedural formalities and appellate rights, is far superior to class
arbitration for protecting their rights. The United States Chamber of
Commerce has described class arbitration as follows: “Class arbitration is a
worst-of-all-worlds Frankenstein’s monster: It combines the enormous
stakes, formality and expense of litigation that are inimical to bilateral
arbitration with exceedingly limited judicial review of the arbitrators’
decisions.”129 Stating that class actions, if allowed, must proceed in court
rather than arbitration is consistent with the corporate preference for
carving out “bet the company” cases.
Moreover, this type of anti-severability clause, while ostensibly
indicating a hostility only to class arbitration, actually evinces hostility to
all mandatory arbitration, both joint and individual. The anti-severability
provision does not say that if the class action ban is declared unenforceable,
then all class proceedings can proceed in court while individual cases will
be sent to arbitration. It eliminates mandatory arbitration for all claims.
Indeed, corporate organizations have been quite frank in stating that if they
could not impose a class action ban as a condition of arbitration, they
would walk away from arbitration entirely, including arbitration of
individual claims. 130 The breadth of their statements, and of the antiseverability provisions that companies like DIRECTV use, suggests that
companies never wanted their disputes to be resolved in arbitration.
Rather, companies use arbitration to eliminate any dispute resolution at all.
C. Current Litigation Regarding Carve-Outs
Although carve-outs are sometimes discussed in litigation, courts have
not addressed carve-outs in terms of determining what is an appropriate or

(on file with author) (“If these terms prohibiting class, representative, or consolidation
procedures are held to be legally unenforceable for any reason with respect to a Claim, then
the Claim must be handled through litigation in court instead of by arbitration.”).
129
Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellants at 9, Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. v. Sterman, No. 1510627 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2015).
130
See, e.g., Richard Frankel, “What We Lose in Sales We Make Up in Volume”: The
Faulty Logic of the Financial Services Industry’s Response to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s Proposed Rule Prohibiting Class Action Bans in Arbitration Clauses,
48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 283, 296 (2016) (documenting how businesses have said they would
abandon arbitration if they could not ban class actions).
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inappropriate level of hostility to arbitration for purposes of FAA
preemption. When courts have addressed carve-outs, they generally have
indicated that it is entirely acceptable for private parties to express hostility
to arbitration, or to express the view that arbitration is inferior to litigation,
by using carve-outs.
Carve-outs are sometimes discussed in determining whether a
particular dispute falls within the carve-out and is not subject to
arbitration,131 or in determining whether an arbitration clause should be
given a broad or a narrow interpretation. 132 Some parties also have argued
that arbitration clauses with extremely broad carve-outs that give one party
the right to bring any claim in court lack consideration because they do not
place any obligation on that party. Courts have differed about whether an
arbitration clause becomes unenforceable in that circumstance. 133
Carve-outs also can be relevant to challenges to an arbitration clause’s
enforceability. Some parties have argued, and courts have gone in different
directions, that “non-mutual” arbitration clauses are unconscionably onesided if they allow the drafting party to bring most of the claims it would
want to pursue in court while binding the other side to arbitration for the
claims that party is most likely to pursue. 134 But even in this context,
courts acknowledge that it is perfectly legitimate for a party to express
hostility to arbitration. In fact, courts are less likely to find a non-mutual
arbitration clause unconscionable if a party provides a business justification
for the carve-out.135 Ironically, in this context, expressing hostility to
131
See, e.g., FT & T Consulting Inc. v. Cargowise EDI Inc., No. 09 C 1141, 2009 WL
1904415, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2009) (finding claims not arbitrable when the arbitration
clause specifically excluded disputes relating to performance obligations); Rebolledo v.
Tilly’s, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (arbitration clause that
excluded claims falling within jurisdiction of State Labor Commissioner excluded all
statutory wage claims that could be brought in an administrative proceeding before Labor
Commissioner, regardless of whether claim was actually brought).
132
See, e.g., Local 827, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 458
F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (interpreting arbitration clause in collective bargaining
agreement narrowly when the clause referred to five specific types of disputes to be
arbitrated); Simon v. Pfizer, Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 775–76 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that if
arbitration clause is limited to specific statutory claims it should not be interpreted to extend
broadly to other statutory claims).
133
See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 5.3.1 (discussing this issue and citing cases).
134
See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 6.7.3 (discussing the issue of whether nonmutual arbitration clauses are unconscionable and citing cases).
135
See, e.g., Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2016)
(finding that carve-out for intellectual property claims was not unconscionable because the
defendant had a “legitimate business need” for the “extra margin of safety” that litigation
provides); Delmore v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(finding that arbitration agreement that carved-out claims for injunctive relief for breaches
of confidentiality was not unconscionable because courts are superior to arbitrators in
addressing claims for injunctive relief); Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d
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arbitration, or explaining why some disputes are better addressed in
litigation, makes the arbitration clause stronger and more impervious to
challenges to its enforceability.
In other cases, courts have recognized that arbitration is inferior to
litigation for certain claims, 136 and, paradoxically, have used that to justify
FAA preemption of a rule allowing such claim to proceed in arbitration.
Most notably, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court relied
on corporate arguments about why arbitration is inferior to litigation for
class proceedings to justify the use of class action bans and also to prohibit
states from adopting laws that would place arbitration and litigation on
equal footing with respect to class proceedings. 137 In other words, with
respect to class proceedings, the Court required states to adopt a hostility to
arbitration and forbade them from treating the two equally. Specifically, in
finding that the FAA preempted a California judicial rule finding it
unconscionable to use class action bans in arbitration clauses when applied
to small-dollar claims, the Court applied some of the same reasoning that
companies have used when writing carve-outs. The Court determined that
arbitration was so “poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” in
significant part because class actions involve greater risks to defendants,
which would be unlikely to agree to bet the company, especially given the
limited appellate review of arbitrator decisions. 138
There, the Court concluded that arbitration is inferior to litigation for
class proceedings, and that such hostility to arbitration apparently is
acceptable and does not violate the FAA. Ordinarily that would mean that
such claims can be brought in court, much in the way that carve-outs
862, 872 (D. Or. 2002) (finding that foreclosure claims “are heavily regulated by statute,
allowing for streamlined procedures and effective protections for both sides,” and thus it is
not “unreasonable, much less oppressive, to forego arbitration of such claims”); Salley v.
Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 128 (Pa. 2007) (finding that a carve-out for
foreclosure remedies was not unconscionable because “there are sound pragmatic and policy
reasons why foreclosure proceedings should be pursued in a court of law”).
136
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (recognizing
that agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims are enforceable even if they do not
appear to be “appropriate for arbitration”); Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803
F.3d 425, 437 (9th Cir. 2015) (“By their nature, some types of claims are better suited to
arbitration than others.”).
137
563 U.S. 333, 348–51 (2011).
138
Id. at 350–51; accord Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
686–87 (2010) (expressing similar concerns about how class procedures may cause
“fundamental changes” to the nature of arbitration). Buoyed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Concepcion, corporate parties have tried to extend that reasoning to bar
consumers from bringing claims for public injunctive relief, either in court or in arbitration,
on the ground that claims for public injunctions are incompatible with arbitration. See, e.g.,
Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellants, McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 772 F. App’x 575
(9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-17246).
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preserve claims for court. The Court, however, concluded that California
could not require class claims to be brought in court, but must enforce an
arbitration clause banning any type of class proceeding whatsoever.
Although Concepcion seems to be an unabashedly pro-business, proarbitration decision, it is interesting that Concepcion also implicitly
recognizes that it is acceptable for a public body such as a court to express
some hostility to arbitration.
While courts have addressed carve-outs in these contexts, they have
not addressed carve-outs in considering whether they signal some level of
hostility to arbitration. Nor have they considered whether the hostility
evidenced by carve-outs should have any bearing on the scope and reach of
FAA preemption. That question is discussed in the next section.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE HOSTILITY TO ARBITRATION
The idea that entities believe that arbitration might be preferable to
litigation for some disputes but not for others is hardly surprising. No one
reasonably contends that the question of arbitration versus litigation is all
or nothing, in the sense that arbitration is either always superior to litigation
or that it is always inferior to litigation. 139 It naturally will be the case that
arbitration might be better suited for some disputes than others. 140
Yet, scholars have not examined the parallels between corporate
hostility to arbitration that is permitted by contract, and the judicial and
legislative hostility to arbitration that is preempted by the FAA. Nor have
they examined whether a private party’s value judgments about when
arbitration is inferior to litigation should affect whether the FAA permits
state legislatures and courts to enact laws or apply common-law doctrines
that reflect similar judgments about the value of arbitration vis-à-vis
litigation. This section explores those questions. First, it draws parallels
between the reasoning companies use for carving out specific claims, and
the reasoning that states use when adopting various regulations of
arbitration that are preempted by the FAA. It draws out the dissonance that
results in prohibiting states from expressing hostility to arbitration while

139
The exception might be if arbitration were truly viewed as a veiled attempt at claim
suppression rather than as a mechanism for actual dispute resolution. If arbitration is a
venue where all claims go to die, as some might reasonably argue, then one might be able to
say that arbitration is always inferior to litigation. See, e.g., Arbitration in America:
Hearing Before the S. Comm of the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 16 (Apr. 2, 2019) (testimony of
Myriam Gilles) (“The one and only objective of forced, pre-dispute, class-banning
arbitration clauses is to suppress and bury claims.”).
140
See, e.g., Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1992 (“Given that contractual
relationships tend to involve multiple but differing performance risks, it is not surprising
that parties might prefer to use courts to address some of those risks but arbitration to
address others.”).
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celebrating the right of corporations to do so. Second, this section suggests
that this dissonance is troubling given that companies use carve-outs to
maximize their self-interest at the expense of their potential adversaries.
Third, it suggests that allowing corporations with significant bargaining
power to use carve-outs to promote their private interest while prohibiting
states from regulating arbitration to promote the public interest is antidemocratic and that this distinction should be revisited.
A. Corporate Hostility to Arbitration Parallels State Legislative and
Judicial Hostility to Arbitration
There are strong parallels between corporate hostility to arbitration as
expressed in carve-outs, and state judicial and legislative hostility to
arbitration that is prohibited by the doctrine of FAA preemption. That
makes sense, because both corporate carve-outs and state regulation of
arbitration reflect similar value judgments about the relative strengths of
arbitration versus litigation.
The dichotomy between the two arises because while corporations
necessarily make a value judgment as to the relative merits of arbitration
versus litigation when they draft their arbitration provisions, state
legislatures and state courts are prohibited from making those same value
judgments in seeking to protect the state’s citizens. When a corporation
carves out particular disputes or disputes with particular parties from an
arbitration clause on the theory that arbitration is ill-suited to address them,
that is celebrated as an exercise of contractual freedom. 141 But if a
legislature were to decide that a certain type of dispute was ill suited for
arbitration and therefore must proceed in court, that legislation would be
preempted by the FAA under its current interpretation. 142
This dichotomy deserves closer scrutiny, as there are numerous
examples where corporate hostility to arbitration as reflected in carve-outs
is virtually no different than state legislative or judicial rules that
corporations have argued are preempted as hostile to arbitration.
Corporations like to keep claims for injunctive relief in court because they
view courts as better suited to provide injunctive relief. 143 But when the
California Supreme Court decided that claims for public injunctive relief
should not be resolved in arbitration because of those very same
limitations,144 the Ninth Circuit held that California’s rule was preempted
because it reflected an assumption that arbitrators were inferior to judges in
141

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
143
See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
144
See Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003); Broughton v.
Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
142
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awarding injunctive relief. 145 And the argument that the FAA preempted
California’s rule was made by business interests, including the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers Association, both of
which appeared as amicus curiae to argue in support of preemption. 146
Furthermore, corporations have taken their argument one step further,
arguing that a California law requiring that public injunction claims be
allowable in some forum, either court or arbitration, is preempted by the
FAA, even though such a law treats litigation and arbitration equally. 147
Similarly, just as many contracts carve out repossession actions from
arbitration, because of the need for emergency relief and the necessity of
various judicial procedures, some states prohibit repossession claims from
being resolved in arbitration.148 Those laws are almost certainly preempted
by the FAA, which forbids declaring a particular type of action nonarbitrable.149
The same is true for procedural carve-outs. While companies may
prefer to avoid arbitration for cases they consider to be high stakes, 150 or
they may prefer to import litigation-like procedures such as expanded
discovery and appeal rights,151 legislatures and courts cannot adopt similar
145
See Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2013); Kilgore v.
KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
146
See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc, Kilgore v. KeyBank,
Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-16703) (en banc); Kilgore, 718 F.3d at
1055 (listing amicus curiae brief filed by the American Bankers Association, among others).
147
See Blair v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 827–31 (9th Cir. 2019); see also
Frankel, supra note 119 (describing arguments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
other corporate groups that a California rule prohibiting arbitration clauses that ban
plaintiffs from bringing public injunction actions in either court or arbitration is inconsistent
with the FAA).
148
See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. 1301 and explanatory comment (exempting foreclosure
claims from the state’s compulsory judicial arbitration process on the ground that
foreclosure proceedings are not “not appropriate” for arbitration); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5035 (forbidding arbitration of fee disputes in land such as quiet title actions),
repealed by 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 902 (eff. July 1, 2013). Until recently, a state law
prohibiting arbitration of foreclosure actions would have been preempted. The Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010, however, amended the FAA to prohibit inserting mandatory arbitration
provisions into mortgage contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2018). Presumably, a
company could still require a consumer to arbitrate a foreclosure action as long as the
arbitration provision was part of a different contract and not part of the mortgage loan.
Additionally, one district court has held that this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act does not
apply to arbitration clauses in mortgage loans that were executed prior to Dodd-Frank’s
enactment. See Weller v. HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077–79 (D.
Colo. 2013).
149
AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011) (“When state law
prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward:
The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”).
150
See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
151
See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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rules. The FAA would surely preempt a law stating that all claims over a
certain threshold dollar amount must be brought in court.152 Likewise, the
FAA would preempt a rule that did not forbid arbitration of high-stakes
claims, but simply required that such claims provide for expanded
discovery or appellate review. 153
If a state tried to carve out claims that are “high stakes” for the
plaintiff but not necessarily for the corporate defendant, such laws likely
would be preempted. For example, as the #MeToo movement sheds
greater light on sexual harassment in the workplace, the ability to litigate
sexual harassment claims or bring them to public light has taken on great
importance. There is increased recognition that requiring arbitration of
such claims can keep them in secret and allow serial harassers to continue
their illegal conduct.154 Yet, when New York’s state legislature recently
tried to forbid mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims, that law
was struck down as preempted. 155
As explained above, parties carve out claims, such as debt collection
claims, where they think the law is clear and where they worry that
arbitrators are less likely than judges to follow the law. 156 But a law that
makes debt-collection claims non-arbitrable, or any other law that tries to
distinguish between claims that arbitrators are better suited to handle from
ones they are less well-suited to handle, would be preempted. Parties
exhibit a hostility to arbitration as a plaintiff by carving out claims in ways
that ensure that they can litigate claims in court where they will be the
plaintiff but that any claim where they will be a defendant will be subject to

152

See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 437–38 (9th Cir. 2015)
(suggesting that parties can choose to litigate high-stakes claims but not that states could
require parties to litigate high-stakes claims).
153
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341–42 (stating that a law requiring judicially monitored
discovery in arbitration would be preempted). The one place where there may be parity
between corporate hostility and public hostility is in the area of appellate review. That is
because the Supreme Court has indicated that both contracting parties and legislators or
judges are prohibited from providing for expanded appellate review of an arbitrator’s
decision. See supra note 99.
154
See, e.g., Hope Reese, Gretchen Carlson on How Forced Arbitration Allows
Companies to Protect Harassers, VOX (May 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com/conversations
/2018/4/30/17292482/gretchen-carlson-me-too-sexual-harassment-supreme-court (describing
how Gretchen Carlson and other victims of sexual harassment have argued that requiring
arbitration of sexual harassments claims keeps allegations secret and allows harassment to
continue, and describing how advocates have urged Congress to enact legislation to restrict
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims).
155
See Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, No. 18cv11528 (DLC), 2019 WL 2610985
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (finding that FAA preempted New York statute forbidding
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims).
156
See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.

FRANKEL (DO NOT DELETE)

742

12/21/2019 3:57 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:707

mandatory arbitration. 157 One way to address this hostility would be to
enact a law giving the plaintiff the option of proceeding in court or in
arbitration. That too, would be preempted.
State laws that attempt to mirror the anti-severability provisions of
many corporate arbitration clauses also face preemption challenges. Courts
have occasionally addressed anti-severability principles in the context of
addressing unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses.
Specifically, when a provision in an arbitration clause is struck down as
unconscionable, the court must decide whether to sever the unconscionable
provision and enforce the remainder of the arbitration clause, or whether to
strike down the entire arbitration clause. Some courts have applied an antiseverability principle in certain circumstances, holding that if an arbitration
clause is permeated with unfairness, the entire provision should be struck
down because the enforceable portions cannot be separated from the
unenforceable ones.158 Corporations have pushed forward the argument
that the courts’ application of anti-severability principles is preempted,
because courts purportedly refuse to sever unconscionable arbitration
provisions more often than they refuse to sever unconscionable provisions
from other contracts.159 While corporations have written anti-severability
provisions into their arbitration clauses, they have simultaneously tried to
invalidate judicial anti-severability rules as preempted by the FAA. In
short, state governments seek to carve out claims or procedures from
arbitration for many of the same reasons that corporations carve out claims.
Yet, corporations are permitted to implement these carve outs while states
are not.
B. Corporate Carve-outs Maximize Self-Interest
This dichotomy between prohibiting states from expressing hostility
to arbitration while allowing corporations to do so is troubling given that
corporations likely use carve-outs because they want to maximize their
self-interest. It stands to reason that when parties express hostility to
arbitration through the use of carve-outs, they do so because they believe
that such hostility is advantageous to them. While no single carve-out is
universally used, carve-outs reveal a flaw in the Supreme Court’s
157

See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 501 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012).
159
See, e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. Zaborowski, 136 S. Ct.
1539 (2016) (No. 14-1458) (arguing that the FAA preempts California’s state-law rule about
when an unenforceable portion of an arbitration clause can or cannot be severed from the
rest of the agreement); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–34, Winston & Strawn, LLC v.
Ramos, No. 18-1437 (U.S. May 14, 2019) (same).
158
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articulation of how the FAA preempts any rule that reflects hostility to
arbitration. As previously explained, the Court has assumed that any state
law must assume that arbitration is just as good or better than litigation for
both parties involved in order to comply with the FAA.
But a company’s decision to use an arbitration clause (or to designate
certain claims for arbitration and carve out others for litigation) signifies its
belief that arbitration is a superior alternative for the company and also an
inferior alternative for the company’s potential adversary. Indeed,
companies’ selective use of carve-outs—and particularly companies’ use of
carve-outs to distinguish between claims where the company will be a
plaintiff and those where it will be a defendant—shows that companies use
arbitration when they think it gives them an advantage over their adversary,
and that they use litigation when they think litigation is more advantageous.
Arbitration clauses are about dispute resolution, and dispute resolution is
inherently adversarial. Thus, a party’s choice about its dispute resolution
system likely reflects its attempt to maximize its advantage relative to its
potential opposing parties. 160 In other words, even a decision to use
arbitration in the first place, with or without carve-outs, may be based on an
assumption that arbitration is an inferior alternative for some party to the
agreement. Accordingly, hostility to arbitration may be embedded in
virtually any decision a company makes about arbitration, because every
decision reflects a value judgment about the relative merits of arbitration
versus litigation.
There are several reasons to think that carve-outs, particularly those
appearing in non-negotiable adhesion contracts between companies and
their customers or employees, are designed to advantage corporate
defendants at the expense of individual plaintiffs. First, the claimsuppressing arbitration clauses described earlier are used to protect
defendants from accountability by making it difficult or impossible for
individuals to vindicate their rights. Second, the differential use of
arbitration when companies are likely to be plaintiffs rather than defendants
shows that companies may see arbitration as systematically favoring
defendants.
Third, the way corporations carve out particular contractual
relationships from arbitration, as opposed to particular types of disputes,
reinforces that many companies do not see arbitration as a superior forum

160

That is not necessarily true in all circumstances, as a company might choose
arbitration because it thinks that it will benefit from potential cost savings regardless of how
it fares in particular disputes, or because it thinks it will get speedier resolution even if it
loses more disputes that it would otherwise lose. Cf. Hylton, supra note 87, at 213
(hypothesizing that parties will use arbitration when the costs of litigation outweigh its
benefits).
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for addressing disputes, but instead as a way of suppressing those disputes.
One study examined arbitration clauses used by publicly traded consumer
finance and telecommunication companies and compared their contracts
with other companies to the contracts they used with consumers. 161 They
found that companies used arbitration clauses in consumer contracts at a
much higher rate than they did in their business-to-business contracts.162
Notably, the arbitration clauses in the consumer contracts all had class
action bans, while almost none of the business-to-business contracts
contained a class action ban.163
As to this latter reason, one possible explanation is that the types of
disputes likely to arise in the business-to-business context are better suited
to litigation, while the business-to-consumer disputes are better suited (in
the corporate party’s view) to arbitration. 164 But that seems unlikely, for
several reasons. First, many consumer disputes involve disputes over
credit and loans, and illegal and deceptive practices that relate to those
loans. Lending and credit is one of the subject matters that is most often
carved out of arbitration clauses and reserved for litigation in the businessto-business context.165 It stands to reason that if litigation offers
advantages over arbitration for debt collection in the business-to-business
context, it should also offer advantages in the business-to-consumer
context. Second, several corporate organizations have expressed that they
prefer to operate under a single dispute resolution system rather than under
two different dispute resolution systems. It is allegedly more costly and
more complicated for a company to face some disputes in litigation and
others in arbitration.166 But if that is true, then companies should not prefer
to arbitrate with some parties and litigate with others. They should prefer
to entirely litigate or entirely arbitrate. The fact that companies
differentiate between parties suggests that where they use arbitration
clauses, they are doing so because they think it will stop disputes from
being resolved, thus avoiding arbitration altogether, and not because they
would rather arbitrate consumer claims and litigate business-to-business
claims.

161

Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 97, at 880–81.
Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 97, at 876 (finding that over 75% of
consumer contracts required arbitration while less than 10% of business-to-business
contracts required arbitration).
163
Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 97, at 884 (finding that every arbitration
clause in a consumer contract contained a class action ban).
164
See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 457–67.
165
See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
166
Frankel, supra note 130, at 297 (explaining how some business organizations and
commentators “have suggested it is too expensive for companies to deal with two different
dispute resolution systems–judicial and arbitration”).
162
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Additionally, it is notable that carve-outs appear more often where
there is greater disparity in bargaining power between the parties and less
opportunity for negotiation.167 Unsurprisingly, these “carve-outs often
seem to benefit one party to the agreement.” 168 This also suggests that
carve-outs are not used only in situations where both parties can freely
negotiate and jointly decide that litigation is preferable to arbitration.
Rather, it appears more likely that carve-outs are forced on the weaker
party by the stronger party in order to maximize the stronger party’s
advantage in any dispute. In other words, carve-outs are simply a reminder
that the drafting party chooses arbitration where it thinks that arbitration
will benefit the corporation, and chooses litigation where it thinks that
arbitration is inferior to litigation for protecting its private interest.
C. Subverting Democratic Accountability
This paper has attempted to show that parties (and, in particular,
corporate parties) are expressing the same hostility to arbitration through
contract that the Supreme Court has held that states are precluded from
expressing through legislation and judicial decision-making.
This
dichotomy is troubling. It is not self-evident that the former should be
permitted while the latter is prohibited. After all, if one purpose of the
FAA is to eradicate hostility to arbitration, then the FAA should not
distinguish between corporate hostility to arbitration and legislative or
judicial hostility to arbitration. If corporations are allowed to indulge
certain assumptions about the limitations and flaws of arbitration when
they design their arbitration clauses, then it would seem equally appropriate
for state governments to adopt those same assumptions when seeking to
regulate arbitration.
Although existing arbitration doctrine provides an explanation for this
disparate treatment, that explanation lacks force in a world of boilerplate,
non-negotiable adhesion contracts. Current doctrine describes arbitration
as being a matter of private choice. The Court has said that “arbitration
under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion,”169 that the FAA
embodies the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract,”170 and that courts must enforce arbitration clauses “according to
their terms.”171 If the fundamental difference between arbitration and
Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1968 (finding that “[i]f that party has
substantial bargaining power in the drafting of the contract, carve-outs will appear at very
high rates”).
168
Id.
169
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989).
170
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
171
Volt, 489 U.S. at 478; AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 n.6
167
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litigation is choice—that in arbitration the parties can choose how they
design their dispute resolution process, whereas in court they cannot—then
contractual hostility is acceptable even if legislative hostility is not. 172
Accordingly, current doctrine allows corporations to express as much
or as little hostility to arbitration as they wish, by giving corporations wide
latitude to design arbitration clauses in any way, subject only to the
limitation that they cannot violate general principles that apply to all
contracts.173 And this gives corporate parties significant power to write
their arbitration provision in the most self-interested manner possible,
while arguing that any attempt by the state to rein in their behavior is
preempted. Current doctrine gives corporate parties a powerful weapon to
say that their arbitration clauses must be enforced at all costs, even if they
are one-sided, because the FAA requires arbitration clauses to be enforced
“according to their terms.”174 Parties can choose to adopt limitations on
their arbitration clauses based on hostility to arbitration, but those
limitations cannot be forced upon them by state law. Parties can contract
for expanded discovery in arbitration, but they cannot be required to allow
for expanded discovery; 175 parties can agree to place their arbitration clause
in bold type at the top of the contract, but they cannot be forced to do so;
parties can agree to allow class actions in court or in litigation, but they
cannot be forced by a state to allow class actions. 176
This logic rests on the assumption that voluntary, bargained-for
hostility to arbitration is acceptable because it reflects the will of the parties
and is based on choice. By contrast, state regulation of arbitration that
arises out of a suspicion that arbitration may be unfair or less favorable
than litigation in certain circumstances is coercive and limits the parties’
freedom to design their arbitration clauses as they see fit.
That distinction may resonate in a world of bargained-for, arm’s-

(2011); see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (authorizing federal courts to order arbitration “in
accordance with the terms of the agreement”).
172
See, e.g., Chorley Enters. Inc. v. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests., Inc., 807 F.3d 553, 570–
71 (4th Cir. 2015) (“FAA preemption prevents states from carving out wholesale exceptions
to arbitration. It does not prevent private parties from agreeing to litigate, rather than
arbitrate, specific claims.”) (internal citation omitted).
173
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (making arbitration clauses enforceable “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
174
Volt, 489 U.S. at 478; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.6; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4
(authorizing federal courts to order arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
agreement”).
175
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 (stating that parties can voluntarily agree to judicially
enforceable discovery but that such a rule cannot be imposed on them).
176
See id. at 351 (stating that parties could agree to allow class arbitrations, but they
cannot be required by the state to do so, because “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and
the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations”).
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length contracts between two parties with similar bargaining power and
similar knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks of arbitration. Perhaps
that world exists for some business-to-business contracts where the parties
have the power to negotiate over the specific terms of an arbitration clause.
But that world is a fantasy in the realm of boilerplate adhesion contracts
that dominate consumer and employment relationships. Virtually all
consumer contracts are non-negotiable contracts entered into between
individual consumers and large corporations. 177 The Supreme Court has
frankly acknowledged that “the times in which consumer contracts were
anything other than adhesive are long past.”178 The notion that arbitration
clauses are voluntarily agreed to and reflect deliberate choice by the parties
is illusory. 179 Instead, they arise in transactions were the consumer lacks
bargaining power, and where there is a vast informational asymmetry
between the consumer and the corporation about the significance and the
effect of the arbitration clause.180
From the consumer’s perspective, the arbitration clause imposed by a
corporation as part of a non-negotiable adhesion contract is just as
involuntary as a rule imposed by a court or a legislature. There is little
difference between a corporation unilaterally dictating that certain claims
cannot be arbitrated because they are better suited for courts (such as class
actions, debt collection, and injunctive relief) and a legislature dictating
that those claims cannot be arbitrated because they are better suited for
courts. For the consumer, the corporation is as powerful as the state. 181
177

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47.
179
See MARGARET J ANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE : THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 86–90 (2013) (questioning whether that the rise of modern boilerplate
adhesion contracts is consistent with traditional notions of contractual consent); Brian Bix,
Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 251 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds.,
2010) (concluding that the notion of consent, as “expressed by the ideal of ‘freedom of
contract,’” is effectively “absent in the vast majority of contracts we enter into these days,”
though also concluding that this lack of meaningful assent is not problematic).
180
Indeed, some studies have shown that consumers are often not aware that the
contracts they sign contain an arbitration clause, or if they are, they do not understand what
it means or its significance. See generally Sovern, supra note 8.
181
Courts have also, and perhaps unwittingly, reinforced this narrative that arbitration
clauses simply represent the corporate defendant’s interest rather than the mutual agreement
of the parties. When applying the FAA or interpreting arbitration clauses, courts have
focused on what the corporate defendant’s expectations are and have ignored what the
consumer would have wanted, tacitly acknowledging that the consumer has no bargaining
power and the consumer’s interest is therefore irrelevant. In Concepcion, when describing
why AT&T Mobility carved out class proceedings from its arbitration clause, the Supreme
Court noted that “class arbitration increases risks to defendants” and concluded, “[w]e find
it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of
review.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350–51. Noticeably absent is any discussion of what the
consumer-plaintiffs would have wanted, or why they would have agreed to a class action
178
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Neither situation is voluntary, and both are equally coercive.
In fact, in the adhesion world of consumer contracts, it is more
troubling to give corporations the authority to determine when arbitration is
flawed or inferior to court than it is to give authority to state legislatures
and courts—yet that is exactly what the FAA does. Corporations act to
maximize their own self-interest.
Legislatures and courts are
democratically accountable and are supposed to act to protect the public at
large.182 That means that corporations have full license to express hostility
to arbitration when doing so works to their advantage. And it appears that
is exactly how corporations use carve-outs: to maximize their own
advantage, suppress claims by injured consumers and employees, and
insulate themselves from accountability.
It would make more sense to give legislatures and courts acting in the
interests of their citizenry an equal power to adopt carve-outs from
arbitration or to regulate arbitration in order to promote fairness. Giving
states this power would not necessarily cause undue harm to companies
that currently use arbitration clauses. It is important to recognize that
legislatures do not just speak for consumers, but for all constituents,
including corporate constituents. 183 Thus, corporations would still have
plenty of voice through the legislative process, especially given the money
that they can bring to bear on campaigning and lobbying efforts. Whereas
current doctrine gives the corporation unilateral power to express hostility
to arbitration, a doctrine that gives the legislature equivalent power to
express hostility through regulation would likely achieve fairer results. If
corporations can avoid the problematic aspects of arbitration by contract,
then legislatures also should be able to protect their constituents against the
problematic aspects of arbitration by statute and regulation.
Thus, current doctrine seems to get everything backwards. The
corporation, the party acting in its own self-interest, can express any

ban that deprives them of any meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights. Courts have
done this in other arbitration contexts as well, such as whether a corporation’s agents can
enforce an arbitration clause even though they did not sign it. In one case, the Texas
Supreme Court held, “When contracting parties agree to arbitrate all disputes ‘under or with
respect to’ a contract (as they did here), they generally intend to include disputes about their
agents’ actions . . . .” In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2006).
Although the court stated that the parties intend to include disputes involving “their” agents,
typically only corporate parties have agents. Individuals and consumers often do not.
182
See RADIN, supra note 179, at 94 (“The laws of the state are supposedly established
in the public interest and not in the private interest of a particular firm. Boilerplate schemes
by their nature are in the interest of a firm and its market strategy and profits.”).
183
See, e.g., Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model on
Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
279, 280 (2015) (describing the efforts of “influential business-funded think tanks” to lobby
state legislatures to pass laws limiting the ability of consumers to protect their rights).
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amount of hostility it wants in its arbitration clause, and there is virtually
nothing a consumer or employee can do about it. The legislature, which is
democratically accountable and supposed to represent its citizens as a
whole, is powerless to address any aspect of arbitration that it deems
problematic or less fair than litigation. 184
While not all carve-outs are one-sided, many carve-outs are.
Moreover, the fact that carve-outs are used more often where one party
lacks bargaining power reinforces that carve-outs are imposed by the
stronger party and are not voluntarily negotiated. 185 Giving legislatures
similar authority to the parties that draft arbitration clauses can rectify this
imbalance and will help ensure that when arbitration is used, it is used
fairly. Just as companies can decide that they do not want the burdens and
expense of class arbitration, states should be able to decide that class
actions must be allowed in court if they are going to be prohibited in
arbitration. Just as companies can contract for extra discovery if they are
concerned about arbitrators making inaccurate decisions, legislatures also
should be able to ensure that consumers have an ability to conduct
sufficient discovery to build a case in arbitration. When a legislature
regulates some aspect of arbitration to try and make it fairer for all parties
involved, that purported hostility should not be treated any differently than
the hostility exhibited by corporate drafters of arbitration clauses.
Of course, not all corporate hostility to arbitration necessarily is onesided. A provision allowing repossession actions to proceed in court or for
injunctive claims to proceed in court may help both parties, as both may
benefit from additional judicial process or from a judge’s greater ability to
award injunctive relief. But whether corporate hostility systematically
favors one side or the other obscures the larger point. If a corporation can
decide that it wants to reserve certain claims for courts because it thinks
courts are superior to arbitrators for those claims, then there is no reason
why legislatures should not be able to draw the same conclusion and
determine that certain types of claims should be decided by a court rather
than an arbitrator.

184

This is a problem afflicting adhesive contracts generally. See, e.g., RADIN, supra
note 179, at 23 (asserting that through adhesion contracts, corporations “delete rights that
are granted through democratic processes”); see also David Horton, Mass Arbitration and
Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 502 (2014) (arguing that “adhesive
arbitration clauses push the boundaries of ex ante consent, eliminate ex post judicial
oversight, and ultimately displace democratically-created rights”). That problem is
exacerbated in the arbitration context. Whereas state governments can regulate the use of
adhesion contracts, their power to regulate arbitration is much more limited thanks to the
FAA.
185
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Although current doctrine allows corporate hostility to arbitration
while simultaneously prohibiting equivalent legislative or judicial hostility,
that doctrine lacks salience in the world of adhesive, take-it-or-leave-it
consumer and employment contracts. Instead, this distinction elevates
absolute freedom of contract over genuine concern about arbitration
fairness. In doing so, current doctrine merely perpetuates existing
disparities by allowing the corporate party to carve out claims or design
arbitration procedures that maximize its advantage while prohibiting
government actors from taking steps to level the playing field for the
individual on the other side of the contract. How current doctrine
surrounding FAA preemption could be adapted to better account for
corporate hostility to arbitration is discussed in the next section.
V. ACCOUNTING FOR CORPORATE HOSTILITY IN FAA PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE
The fact that corporations frequently express some hostility to
arbitration in the way they draft their arbitration clauses suggests that states
should have greater latitude to express hostility to arbitration without
running into FAA preemption. This section shows how corporate hostility
to arbitration could justify re-conceptualizing FAA preemption doctrine in
two possible ways. First, the fact that parties believe that litigation is
sometimes preferable to arbitration indicates that not all hostility to
arbitration is improper or reflects an irrational bias against arbitration.
Accordingly, not all judicial or legislative hostility to arbitration should be
deemed to conflict with the FAA’s goals. Rather, if the hostility seems
justifiable, because of the differences between litigation and arbitration,
and because of the ways that arbitration can be designed to strategically
favor one party over the other, then it is perfectly appropriate for the state
to regulate arbitration in the name of fairness. 186
Second, and more radically, the way that arbitration doctrine
distinguishes between contracted-for limitations on arbitration and
governmentally imposed limitations on arbitration suggests that FAA
preemption should not apply to adhesion contracts at all. The fact that
parties can contract for whatever limitations on arbitration they wish, but
that the state cannot impose the same limitations, indicates that the most
fundamental aspect of arbitration is choice, rather than any particular
procedural device. 187 But adhesion contracts, by definition, are contracts
186

See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011).
See Stipanowich, supra note 99, at 51 (“Choice is what sets arbitration apart from
litigation.”); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1946 (2014) (describing the prevailing view among arbitration
scholars that the goal of the FAA was to preserve private autonomy and choice); Frankel,
187
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where one party has no meaningful choice. If the FAA is about protecting
the parties’ ability to mutually choose the procedures they prefer, then it
has no role to play in the world of adhesion contracts at all. In turn,
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts should be subject to government
regulation in the same way as any other contract.
A. Allowing Some Legislative and Judicial Hostility to Arbitration
The fact that parties express hostility to arbitration by carving out
particular claims or by importing judicialized procedures into arbitration,
and the fact that Congress and agencies have acted similarly at the federal
level, reveals that not all hostility to arbitration is improper. Parties have
legitimate reasons for thinking that arbitration is inferior to litigation, and
scholars have recognized as much. 188
Hostility to arbitration therefore is both inevitable and legitimate.
While current FAA doctrine pretends otherwise, there is no good reason to
continue to perpetuate such a fiction. If it is acceptable for corporations to
express hostility to arbitration in their adhesion contracts with consumers
and employees, then it should be acceptable for governmental actors to
express hostility by regulating arbitration, either by carving out certain
claims from arbitration, or by regulating the arbitration process to make it
fairer or to address its deficiencies.
This begs the question of how to distinguish legitimate hostility to
arbitration from illegitimate hostility to arbitration. While it may seem
difficult at first, there are various ways to approach this. Initially, a law that
affects arbitration should not automatically trigger “rigorous” 189 scrutiny or
inherent suspicion of that law. It may turn out to be the case that most
hostility to arbitration, and hence most regulation of arbitration, is
legitimate. Recall that the framers of the FAA were seeking to reverse a
broad and sweeping hostility to arbitration in which courts would refuse to
specifically enforce an arbitration clause simply because it was an
arbitration clause—in other words, wholesale prejudice against arbitration
writ large, without reference to whether arbitration was better or worse than
litigation under any specific circumstances. 190 There is a big difference
between stating that arbitration clauses are always unenforceable and
stating, for example, that arbitration clauses are unenforceable for claims
supra note 39, at 250–52.
188
See supra Part III; Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1969 (stating that parties
may choose carve-outs when “they trust courts to better protect their interests than
arbitrators”).
189
Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119–20 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating
that the FAA enshrines “a principle of rigorous equality” between arbitration clauses and
other contracts).
190
See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
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involving high stakes, or stating that arbitration clauses can be enforced,
but that the arbitration system must allow for sufficient discovery to enable
the plaintiff to build his or her case. These limitations are not fully hostile
to arbitration, but instead rest on assumptions that arbitration, in particular
situations, may be less likely than a court to result in an accurate and
satisfactory outcome.
One way to approach this is by looking to the carve-outs used by
private parties. If private arbitration clauses carve out a particular claim or
procedure, then that should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that a state
regulation equivalent to the carve-out is not preempted. For example, if
private parties carve out injunctive claims because they think that courts are
superior at managing injunctive claims, then states should be able to adopt
a regulation forbidding mandatory arbitration of injunctive claims. If they
did so, that regulation would be presumptively legitimate, though that
presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the state had an illegitimate
or pretextual reason for adopting the regulation. This would also hold true
for other types of frequently carved-out claims, such as small claims, debt
collection claims, anti-severability principles, and so on.
A related framework is one that would look at the state government’s
motivation or purpose in assessing whether a particular rule expressing
hostility to arbitration is preempted or not. Professor Hiro Aragaki has
suggested applying an anti-discrimination framework that asks if
legislation regulating arbitration is motivated by invidious discrimination
or whether it has a legitimate justification, in the same way that antidiscrimination law analyzes allegedly illegal behavior.191 Similarly,
Professor David Horton argues that the FAA should only preempt state
rules that “unjustifiably disfavor arbitration,” i.e., ones that rest on an
inherent suspicion of arbitration rather than ones that attempt to recognize a
specific and concrete drawback or deficiency of arbitration. 192 These
models are commendable, and deserve fuller consideration. Looking at the
FAA through the lens of contractual hostility to arbitration reinforces the
view of these scholars that some hostility to arbitration is acceptable and
bolsters the argument that states should be free to express justified hostility
to arbitration without being subject to federal preemption.
In determining whether a legislature has a legitimate reason for
regulating arbitration, courts could also borrow from Commerce Clause or
Equal Protection analysis. In particular, state legislatures could make
findings when adopting laws regulating arbitration, and courts could
examine those findings as part of the preemption inquiry. Just as courts
191

Aragaki, supra note 186, at 1263–71.
David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public
Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1255, 1265–72 (2013).
192
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can consider congressional findings in determining whether a federal law
affects interstate commerce, courts could also look to legislative findings
that explain the reasons for regulating arbitration in considering whether
the law reflects an unjustified hostility to arbitration. 193 And unlike current
law, which establishes a presumption that any regulation of arbitration is
inappropriately hostile and is preempted unless shown otherwise, accepting
the proposition that hostility to arbitration is natural and inevitable should
lead courts to give some deference (subject to rebuttal) to legislative
findings indicating that the state has a legitimate reason for imposing some
limit on the scope or process of arbitration. 194 Similarly, courts could
import an Equal Protection framework and presume that the state has a
rational basis for regulating arbitration unless evidence shows otherwise. 195
As explained above, allowing regulation where there is justified
hostility to arbitration is more even-handed and better levels the playing
field between corporations and consumers. Instead of allowing only selfinterested hostility that is used to maximize one party’s advantage relative
to the other, allowing regulation by democratically accountable bodies can
advance everyone’s interests.
This view also is consistent with the Court’s statements that Congress
enacted the FAA to place arbitration clauses “upon equal footing” with
other contracts. If one thinks of “equal footing” in a process-oriented way
rather than in a substantive way, then allowing regulation of arbitration
clauses treats them the same as other contracts. Contract law generally is
state law. Thus, contracts are subject to regulation by state governments. 196
193
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (“While Congress normally
is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce, the existence of such findings may enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect is visible to the naked eye.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
194
In fact, that is how courts used to analyze federal statutes under the Commerce
Clause, before the Supreme Court changed the law in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557 n.2 (1995). See, e.g., Presault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (“We evaluate this claim
under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a congressional finding
that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce if there is any rational basis for such a
finding[.]”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104, 1111 (7th
Cir. 1990) (“If we find that Congress has any rational basis for finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, our investigation is at an end.”).
195
See FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.”).
196
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1941) (“[N]either property rights nor
contract rights are absolute . . . . Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.”).
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Currently, while legislators can regulate most contracts in almost any way
they wish, one type of contractual provision they cannot regulate is an
arbitration clause. 197 States often regulate contracts where they perceive a
risk of unfairness. States might regulate contracts in one substantive area,
such as franchise contracts.198 Or they might regulate where they perceive
market failures, such as where there are disparities in bargaining power
between contracting parties.199 Allowing states to regulate arbitration
where they perceive justifiable hostility, say to address specific
shortcomings, or to carve out specific subject matters from arbitration
where arbitration may be inferior to litigation, is perfectly consistent with
how states regulate other contracts. Making arbitration clauses impervious
to all regulation other than general common-law rules applicable to all
contracts is not.
B. Adhesion and Preemption
A more radical viewpoint is that the dissonance between permissible
corporate hostility to arbitration expressed through contract and
impermissible hostility expressed in state regulation indicates that the FAA
should not limit or prohibit states from regulating arbitration clauses in
non-negotiable adhesion contracts at all. In other words, the FAA should
not preempt any regulation of adhesive arbitration clauses.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Concepcion, parties can contract
for limitations, conditions, or restrictions on arbitration that state
legislatures cannot impose. 200 That distinction is important in thinking
about the FAA’s purposes and objectives, because the FAA only preempts
rules that stand as an obstacle to the performance of the statute’s purposes.
The FAA’s purpose cannot be to enshrine any particular procedure or
characteristic of arbitration, because as the Court indicated, parties can
contract for almost any procedure they want, subject to a few limitations. 201
Rather, as several scholars have identified, this distinction suggests that the
fundamental characteristic of arbitration that the FAA was concerned with

197
Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[N]o state
may simply subject arbitration to individuated regulation in the same manner as it might
subject some other unprotected contractual device (say, a prescriptive period or exculpatory
clause contained within a private contract).”).
198
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2014) (regulating a franchisor’s ability to
terminate a franchisee).
199
Minimum wage laws, child labor laws, or other laws regulate contractual
employment relationships are examples of state laws that limit the rights of contracting
parties for the purpose of protecting fairness.
200
AT&T, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
201
See id.
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was choice. 202 And as I have argued elsewhere, that choice means
meaningful, freely negotiated choice exercised by both parties to the
transaction. 203
The adhesion contracts and arbitration clauses that are present in
consumer transactions, however, are defined by the absence of choice. The
only party with any control over the contract terms is the corporate party
that drafts and imposes the arbitration clause. This adhesion regime is
arguably at odds with the FAA’s purpose of preserving meaningful choice.
Several scholars have addressed how the FAA was intended for
commercial transactions between sophisticated parties with roughly equal
bargaining power rather than for take-it-or-leave-it business-to-consumer
transactions.204 Moreover, the Act’s legislative history indicates that
Congress never envisioned that the Act would apply to take-it-or-leave-it
adhesion contracts like the ones used in employment settings.205
If the FAA was intended to protect the enforcement of arbitration
clauses that were the product of meaningful choice, then the Act has no
bearing on adhesion contracts marked by the absence of choice.
Regulation of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts therefore does not
run afoul of the FAA and should not be preempted. Society may now
accept that “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other
than adhesive are long past[,]”206 but that does not mean that it must accept
that such contracts are beyond the reach of reasonable regulation designed
to rectify the one-sided nature of adhesion contracts. Treating arbitration
clauses equally with other contracts should recognize that adhesive
arbitration clauses, like other adhesive contracts, are characterized by a

202

See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
Frankel, supra note 39, at 251.
204
See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 75–81 (arguing that the framers intended the FAA to be limited to commercial
disputes between business entities); Sternlight, supra note 21, at 647 (“Most commentators
have concluded that the FAA was envisioned as applying to consensual transactions
between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, and not necessarily to
transactions between a large merchant and a much weaker and less knowledgeable
consumer.”).
205
See Sternlight, supra note 21, at 647; see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct.
1612, 1642–43 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The legislative hearings and debate
leading up to the FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to enable merchants of roughly
equal bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes.”)
(emphasis in original); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477–78 (2015)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that the FAA was intended to address arbitration of
commercial disputes and that “Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated that the Court
would apply the FAA to render consumer adhesion contracts invulnerable to attack by
parties who never meaningfully agreed to arbitration in the first place”).
206
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346.
203
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disparity in bargaining power. And just as it is appropriate to regulate
other contracts to correct any unfairness resulting from that disparity, it is
perfectly appropriate for states to correct against unfairness that manifests
in an adhesive arbitration clause. Because adhesion contracts are outside
the purview of what the FAA was trying to protect, states should be
permitted to regulate arbitration clauses appearing in adhesion contracts
without being subject to FAA preemption. This in turn could promote free
choice. If courts interpret the FAA to give states greater authority to
regulate adhesive arbitration agreements than they previously had, that may
encourage parties that wish to use arbitration agreements to give
contracting parties greater negotiating power over the arbitration
provision’s terms.207
VI. CONCLUSION
Aided by corporate and business interests that have a strong interest in
enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court in the last
thirty years has greatly expanded the scope of FAA preemption on the
ground that the Act preempts any state law expressing hostility to
arbitration. At the same time that corporations seek to invalidate any law
that regulates arbitration as representing inappropriate hostility to
arbitration, however, they frequently express their own hostility to
arbitration by using carve-outs and other drafting techniques. While
corporations have the power to express hostility to arbitration when this
approach serves their own interests, they have strategically prevented
democratically accountable state-government institutions from expressing
that same hostility to arbitration in the interest of protecting their citizens.
Current preemption doctrine does not account for this dichotomy. It
should, and FAA preemption principles should recognize that state laws
expressing hostility to arbitration should not necessarily be preempted, as
many of those laws express the same hostility to arbitration that
corporations express in their arbitration clauses.

207

Frankel, supra note 39, at 253.

